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Felony-Murder Doctrine Through the
Federal Looking Glass
HENRY S. NOYES*
INTRODUCTION
The federal felony-murder statute requires the government to prove that a
murder occurred and then calls for a determination of the degree of the
murder for sentencing purposes. The government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with "malice aforethought" in order
to obtain a conviction. The felony-murder statute is not, however, the only
federal statute that seeks to punish a defendant for a felony-related death.
Many other felony statutes allow sentences equivalent to those available
following a murder conviction if a death results during commission of the
felony. It is not clear whether these statutes retain malice aforethought as an
element of the offense.
Part I of this Note argues that federal courts should interpret all federal
felony statutes such that a resulting death and a culpable mens rea for that
death are elements that must be proven at the guilt/innocence stage to
sentence a defendant for the resulting death. Such an interpretation is
consistent with federal felony-murder theory and would avoid constitutional
problems inherent in a murder statute that goes beyond strict liability.
If, and only if, federal courts conclude that death and malice aforethought
are not elements of these offenses, then an analysis of the United States
Sentencing Commission's ("Sentencing Commission") treatment of federal
felony-murder doctrine is necessary. Part II argues that the Sentencing
Commission has misinterpreted federal felony-murder doctrine by applying it
at the sentencing stage. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing
Guidelines" or "Guidelines") treat a death that results during the commission
of a felony as a sentencing factor, rather than as an element of the offense.
This interpretation is not a necessary interpretation and it is problematic
because it creates inconsistencies in the Sentencing Guidelines.
Part III discusses the Sentencing Commission's use of sentencing by
analogy. The Sentencing Commission proceeds on the assumption that other
felonies resulting in death are analogous to murder. The Sentencing Guide-
lines direct federal judges to sentence defendants convicted of a number of
distinct felonies resulting in death under the guidelines applicable to murder.
Sentencing by analogy is improper for two reasons: specifically, murder is not
analogous to other felonies resulting in death; and generally, sentencing by
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analogy violates either the separation of powers doctrine or the delegation
doctrine.
Part IV argues that the Sentencing Commission's interpretation of the
federal felony-murder rule-under which conduct resulting in death is relevant
to sentencing rather than an element of the offense-violates the Due Process
Clause. The Sentencing Guidelines' extension of the felony-murder rule to the
sentencing stage turns the resulting death into a sentencing factor-the proof
of which is more important than the offense of conviction.
The morass that is the Federal Criminal Code may be the root of the
confusion surrounding the use of the felony-murder doctrine in federal
criminal law. Part V argues twofold: that the Sentencing Commission's
treatment of the felony-murder rule may have been an attempt to clarify a
body of criminal law enacted haphazardly, and that uniform treatment of the
federal felony-murder rule should begin with a legislative overhaul of the
Federal Criminal Code. One recent appeal demonstrates the necessity of
addressing how the felony-murder rule applies in federal criminal cases.
UNITED STATES V. RYAN
On October 26, 1993, the Eighth Circuit decided an appeal in the case of
United States v. Ryan.' In Ryan, a jury in Des Moines, Iowa convicted the
defendant, Dale Ryan, of arson charged under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). 2 Fire
destroyed a fitness center managed by Ryan and owned by Ryan's father. Two
firefighters died while fighting the fire. Ryan was sentenced to 328 months
imprisonment.
Ryan appealed his conviction on a number of issues, two of which are
relevant to this Note. First, Ryan was charged in the indictment with causing
the deaths of the firefighters.3 The trial judge, however, was "[u]ncertain
whether the issue of causing death was an element of the offense or merely
a sentencing consideration . . . ." The trial judge, therefore, did not require
the jury to find that Ryan acted with a culpable state of mind with respect to
the deaths that occurred. In fact, "[t]he only verdict rendered by the jury in
1. Ryan, No. 92-1357, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1993). The Ryan opinion was not available
until the date of publication, so all cites are to Westlaw. The official cite in the federal reports is: United
States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 1993). On January 5, 1994, the Eighth Circuit vacated the opinion
on grant of rehearing.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1988). The statute reads:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of
fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate
or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be
imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000, or both; ... and if
death results to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct
or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall also be subject to
imprisonment for any term of years, or to the death penalty or to life imprisonment as provided
in section 34 of this title.
3. Brief for Appellant at 42, United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-
1357); Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-
1357).
4. Brief for Appellant at 42, Ryan (No. 92-1357).
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this case was upon the lesser included offense of 'malicious destruction of a
building by fire.' Upon the greater homicide offense alleged in the indictment
the jury rendered no verdict whatsoever."5 Once the jury found the defendant
guilty of the lesser arson offense, the judge put special interrogatories before
the jury. Based upon the jury's responses, the judge entered a judgment of
conviction upon the greater offense.' Thus, although the jury did not convict
Ryan of the homicide offense, he was sentenced for the greater offense.
Second, in applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Ryan court
"determined that first degree. murder was the most analogous offense" 7 and
applied the guideline applicable to first-degree murder. The court effectively
sentenced Ryan for murder, an offense which requires a showing of a culpable
mens rea as an element of the offense, even though the jury never found this
element.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed Ryan's conviction and sentence and held that
"18 U.S.C. 844(i) is a sentencing enhancement provision, not a separate and
distinct offense with distinct, heightened elements of proof."' The court did
not have to decide whether "malice aforethought" for the death was an
element of the offense as well. The court considered it sufficient that the
district court judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Ryan acted
with "malice aforethought."9 Under the Eighth Circuit's interpretation, the
penalty prescribed for the "resulting death is potentially infinitely more
severe" than the penalty for the underlying offense of arson." The Ryan
opinion may foretell a revolution in criminal law.
Ryan illustrates two major problems with the use of the felony-murder
doctrine" in federal criminal law. First, application of the felony-murder
doctrine has grown beyond its traditional base. The federal felony-murder
doctrine is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1111.12 Yet, Congress has extended the
scope of the federal felony-murder doctrine 13 by enacting a series of statutes
that define felonies such as arson, bank robbery, and aircraft hijacking, and
5. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
6. Id. at 44. The simple felony of arson carries a maximum sentence often years. The maximum
penalty for homicide as a result of arson is life imprisonment or the death penalty. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
7. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, Ryan (No. 92-1357).
8. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 at *9. The court found that "section 844(i) does resemble a sentence
enhancement provision [because] ... [t]he first portion of the lengthy sentence defines the crime of
arson, while the second and third portions seem to do no more than single out a subset of arsonists for
more severe punishment." Id. at *7.9. Id. at **12-13.
10. Id. at *8 (emphasis added). While the court stated that the penalty may be "infinitely more
severe," the court failed to consider whether such an increase violates the due process analysis raised
by McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). See infra part IV (arguing that the Sentencing
Commission's treatment of federal felony-murder doctrine violates due process). The Eighth Circuit in
fact made no reference whatsoever to McMillan in its decision.
11. "Felony-murder doctrine" and "felony-murder rule" are used to connote two distinct concepts
in this Note. "Felony-murder doctrine" covers the general proposition that one who commits a felony
that results in death may be held liable for that death. The "felony-murder doctrine" may, however, be
applied in a variety of ways. "Felony-murder rule" refers to specific codifications and applications of
the "felony-murder doctrine."
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1lll(a) (1988).
13. See infra part I.B.
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providing for enhanced penalties for deaths resulting from these felonies. This
extension has resulted in uncertainty as to whether the homicide provisions
in these statutes are rooted in substantive law or are relevant only to the
sentencing phase. The death of another person and a culpable mens rea
("malice aforethought") for the death must be elements of the offense that the
Government must prove in order to obtain a conviction that sustains a
sentence for murder.
The second problem in Ryan concerns the district court judge's finding that
the guideline for first-degree murder was the "most analogous provision."
Murder requires a finding at the guilt/innocence stage that the defendant acted
with "malice aforethought" resulting in the victim's death. Ryan was
convicted of arson. "Malice aforethought" is not an element of arson.
Therefore, murder is not an analogous provision. Even if murder were
analogous, to allow the trial judge to sentence by analogy denies the
defendant due process and the right to a jury trial at which guilt must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
But Ryan's conviction and sentence for murder present more than a case of
poor analogy. The application of the Sentencing Guidelines to these "resulting
in death" provisions evidences the Eighth Circuit's and the United States
Sentencing Commission's fundamental misunderstanding of traditional federal
felony-murder doctrine. The Eighth Circuit's misunderstanding is manifested
in its holding that the "if death results" provisions are sentencing provisions.
The Sentencing Commission's misunderstanding is evidenced by language in
the Guidelines that calls for sentencing the defendant for murder after
conviction of a felony in a number of other instances if the victim was "killed
under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had
such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the
United States ... .4 Under this sentencing scheme, the prosecutor need
only charge and convict the defendant of a predicate felony. Then, at
sentencing, the prosecution may open a Pandora's box of charges to establish
that the defendant should be sentenced for murder. The sentencing scheme,
therefore, departs from the traditional federal felony-murder rule, which
requires the prosecution to establish murder at the guilt/innocence stage
beyond a reasonable doubt.
This difference in the application of the felony-murder rule derives from a
disparity in the way the language of the statute is read. Under the Eighth
Circuit's and the Sentencing Commission's interpretation, there is simply one
offense, such as arson, and the arson conviction allows for a sentence of up
14. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 61 U.S.L.W. 42 d78,
amend. 4 (May 11, 1993) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments] (amending §§ 2A3.1(c)(I) (criminal
sexual abuse), 2B3.1(c)(1) (robbery), 2B3.2(c)(1) (extortion by force), 2Dl.l(c)(1) (drug offenses),
2E2.1(c)(1) (extortionate extension or collection of credit)). The Sentencing Commission reported these
amendments to Congress in April 1993 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (as amended by section 7109
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690) and the amendments became effective
November 1, 1993.
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to life imprisonment."5 The provisions for increased punishment "if death
results" are then merely sentencing factors. Under a more traditional
interpretation of criminal statutes, 16 arson is one offense, allowing for a
maximum sentence of ten years. 7 Arson where a death results is a separate
offense punishable by life imprisonment. 8 The Fifth Circuit recognized this
traditional interpretation in United States v. Tripplett.'9 In a unanimous
opinion, Judge Wisdom wrote for the court:
To uphold Tripplett's conviction and sentence for violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i), this Court must find that the [G]ovemment proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Tripplett (1) maliciously damaged or destroyed a
building, or attempted to do so; (2) that Tripplett damaged or destroyed the
building by means of fire; (3) that the building was being used in interstate
commerce or in an activity affecting interstate commerce; and (4) that the
fire resulted in the death of a person.2"
Judge Wisdom's opinion stands in stark contrast to the Eighth Circuit's
statement that, "[t]he courts of appeals have not yet construed this aspect of
Section 844(i)."2' To resolve confusion and misunderstanding, Congress and
the federal courts should address the Eighth Circuit's opinion and the
Sentencing Commission's treatment of the federal felony-murder rule.
I. MENS REA AND THE FEDERAL FELONY-MURDER RULE
The federal codification of the felony-murder doctrine, 18 U.S.C. § 1111,
retains "malice aforethought" as an element of the offense. The use of the
felony-murder doctrine has not, however, been limited to 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
Other federal statutes include provisions to address a felony that "results in"
death. 2 The text of these other statutes does not appear to require proof of
a culpable mens rea. For instance, the Eighth Circuit, in the Ryan decision,
15. UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoMMIssIoN, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2K1.4 (1992) (setting forth different levels ofpunishment for the single "offense" of arson). The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are hereinafter referred to as U.S.S.G.
16. Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold dissented on this issue, finding that the homicide provision of
§ 844(i), that reads "if death results to any person," is an element of the offense, not a sentencing factor.
United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092, at *15 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
As the Court has recognized, Section 844(i) is far from clear. It lacks the traditional indicia
of a sentence enhancement; as the Court notes, the increase in punishment upon a finding that
a death has occurred is infinitely more severe, and that increase is not a multiple or a derivative
of the original sentence (either of which might indicate Congress intended a sentence
enhancement). The Court nonetheless concludes, in the face of the ambiguity in the statute, that
its language "militates" in favor of interpreting the "if death results" provision to be a
sentencing factor. This conclusion is inconsistent with the settled rule that ambiguities in
criminal statutes are to be resolved in favor of the defendant, under the Rule of Lenity.
Id. (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
18.Id.
19. Tripplett, 922 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2245 (1991).
20. Id. at 1177 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
21. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 at *7.
22. See infra part I.B.
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decided that the text of the arson statute did not even require proof of the
death itself. This Part argues that federal courts should not only interpret these
statutes such that a resulting death is an element of the offense, they should
also interpret the statutes to include "malice aforethought" regarding the death
as an element of the offense of conviction. Such an interpretation would
complement the federal felony-murder rule, would be consistent with the
treatment afforded "if death results" provisions by several courts, and would
embrace a meaning of the statute which satisfies constitutional scrutiny.'
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1111
The typical felony-murder rule posits that an individual is guilty of first-
degree murder if a death results from conduct during the commission of, or
attempted commission of, a felony.24 The felony-murder doctrine "'reliev[es]
the state of the burden of proving pre-meditation or malice."' '25 Thus, felony
murder was an offense of strict liability as to the death element at common
law.26 This doctrine has been controversial since its creation. England, where
the doctrine originated, abolished the felony-murder rule in 1957.27 In the
United States there have been some judicial and legislative attempts to limit
the expansion of the doctrine by prohibiting conviction for murder if the
resulting death was not a necessary or reasonably foreseeable consequence of
the underlying felony or the circumstances under which the underlying felony
occurred.28 The doctrine, however, has continued to survive in the United
23. The consequences of an alternative interpretation violate the Due Process Clause. See infra part
IV.
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 30 (1980). However, the drafters of the Model Penal
Code believed that the felony-murder doctrine should be abandoned as an independent basis for
establishing first-degree murder. Id.; see also Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Towards a
Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CR1M. L. REv. 73, 78 n.15 (1991) (stating that the
felony-murder doctrine embraces two distinguishable functions in addition to supplying "malice
aforethought" to make the killing a murder. 1) killings during certain felonies make the defendant
eligible for the death penalty and 2) establish the "murder' as "first-degree").
25. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 453 (1985) (quoting Richard Bonnifield, Comment, An Assault
Resulting in Homicide May Be Used to Invoke the Felony-Murder Rule, 13 GONZ. L. REv. 268, 271
(1977)).
26. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 31; Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 457-60.
Strict liability has been described as the siren song of criminal law. "The chief problem... is somehow
to get legislators to lash themselves to the mast to keep from yielding, in the heat of the political
process, to the temptation to define crimes without mens rea." Sanford H. Kadish, Act and Omission,
Mens Rea, and Complicity: Approaches to Codification, I CIuM. L. F. 65, 76-77 (1989).
27. The Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11, § I. There is some debate over the exact origin
and purposes of the felony-murder doctrine. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 449-50.
28. See, e.g., S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1601(c) (1978) (proposed Federal Criminal Code
which was not adopted). But see People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (1969) (rejecting a requirement
of reasonable foreseeability in death of a robbery victim who died of a heart attack because a felon takes
his victim as he finds him), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
These limitations may also be thought of as a "proximate cause" requirement. See, e.g., MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 33-34; WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTiN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
623-32 (2d ed. 1986); David Crump & Susan W. Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine,
8 HARV. J.L, & PUB. POL'Y 359, 383-84, 391-93 (1985). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have
recognized this concern, albeit indirectly (as opposed to directly addressing the felony-murder doctrine).
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States29 and the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has
expanded its application to the sentencing stage.
Congress alleviated concern over a federal strict liability murder statute by
retaining the requirement of proving a culpable mens rea in 18 U.S.C. § 1111,
the federal murder statute.
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any
other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson,
escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual
abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any
human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
Any other murder is murder in the second degree."
"Malice aforethought" remains a necessary element of every murder, be it
murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, or felony murder.3
The language of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) requires that the government first
establish that "murder" was committed with "malice aforethought" '32 before
The Sentencing Guidelines forbid sentencing the defendant for relevant conduct that was not "reasonably
foreseeable." U.S.S.G. § 1B 1.3 cmt. 2, ("Where it is established that the conduct was neither within the
scope of the defendant's agreement, nor was reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal
activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake, such conduct is not included in establishing the
defendant's offense level under this guideline."). But even this minimal requirement may not be taken
seriously. See Brief for Appellant at 28, United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1993) (No.
92-1357) (quoting statement of trial judge):
I do not see a foreseeability requirement in the statutes. The statute simply refers to the conduct
resulting in death, and I think that means just that. Whether such deaths are foreseeable or not,
the only question is did the conduct actually result in the deaths, so I don't think that the
foreseeability on the part of the defendant at the time is an element of the death issue.
29. For a brief discussion of the development of the rule in American law, see People v. Aaron, 299
N.W.2d 304 (1980), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 971 (1990); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6; and Jo
Anne C. Adlerstein, Felony-Murder in the New Criminal Codes, 4 Am. J. CRiM. L. 249 (1975-76). The
felony-murder doctrine is widely criticized by legal commentators as unprincipled. See Roth & Sundby,
supra note 25; Jeanne H. Seibold, Note, The Felony-Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine, 23
CATH. LAW. 133, 133 n.l (1978). See generally George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12
SW. U. L. REV. 413, 417 (1980); James J. Hippard, The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability
Without Fault: An Argument for a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REv. 1039, 1045
(1973); Frederick J. Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 51, 52-53
(1956); Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50
(1956); Note, Felony Murder as a First Degree Offense: An Anachronism Retained, 66 YALE L.J. 427
(1957). But cf. Cole, supra note 24 (proposing a justifiable theory for elaboration of the felony-murder
rule in light of the rejection of strict liability elsewhere in criminal law); Crump & Crump, supra note
28 (defending the rule as a reasonable punishment, reflecting society's idea of proportionality).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a).
31. "We note in passing that under § 1111 all murder, including second-degree murder and felony
murder, requires 'malice aforethought."' United States v. Lilly, 512 F.2d 1259, 1261 nA (9th Cir. 1975)
(emphasis in original).
It should be noted, however, that there has been no dispositive decision by the Supreme Court
interpreting the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (a) in this manner. In People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 715
(Cal. 1983), the California Supreme Court reached an opposite result, based on a unique legislative
history, when interpreting similar language in a state statute.
32. United States v. Sides, 944 F.2d 1554, 1557 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 604
(1991). "Malice aforethought" does not require that the defendant intentionally or knowingly kill
another, but may be established by evidence that is "reckless and wanton and a gross deviation from
1994]
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it can address whether the "murder" is of the first or the second degree.33
The fact that the "murder" occurred during the commission of a felony simply
supplies the predicate to make the "murder" a murder of the first degree. In
addition, because the Due Process Clause requires the government to prove
every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution may
not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming a necessary
element upon proof of the other elements of an offense. 34 The federal felony-
murder statute does not "presume" the existence of "malice aforethought"
from the commission of a felony, because "malice aforethought" is an element
of the offense.
B. Statutes Incorporating a Provision Applicable
"If Death Results"
Federal felony-murder theory requires the government to prove that a
murder occurred and then calls for a determination of the degree of the
murder for sentencing purposes. The felony-murder doctrine has expanded
with the growing complexity of the Federal Criminal Code, causing confusion
as to what level of mens rea is necessary to hold a defendant liable for a
death that occurs during the commission of a felony.
Congress has expanded the jurisdictional reach of federal criminal law under
the guise of the Commerce Clause. 5 While the federalization of criminal law
continues to be criticized;36 Congress has enacted a variety of wide-ranging
a reasonable standard of care, of such a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring that [the] defendant
was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm." United States v. Black Elk, 579 F.2d 49,
51 (8th Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Cox, 509 F.2d 390, 392 (1974)); see
also United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 947-48 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193
(1985); United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 392 n.20 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067
(1984). For purposes of this Note it may be understood that "malice aforethought" encompasses conduct
that is intentional, knowing, and extremely reckless but not conduct that is negligent or merely reckless.
33. United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 788 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2895
(1991); see also Beardslee v. United States, 387 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1967). "Clearly, under the first
sentence of § I 1I I(a), malice aforethought is a necessary factor in the federal crime of murder." Id. at
289 (Justice, then Judge, Blackmun writing for the Eighth Circuit).
34. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977) (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975)) (upholding the portion of a New York murder statute that put the burden of proof upon the
defendant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was acting under extreme emotional
distress because it was not an element of the crime).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The jurisdictional expansion of the Federal Criminal Code under
the guise of the Commerce Clause has generally followed the decision of Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146 (1971) (allowing Congress to exercise criminal jurisdiction over entirely intrastate activity
which adversely affects interstate commerce). See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 137-45
(12th ed. 1991). For a discussion of the jurisdictional basis for expanding the Federal Criminal Code,
see John S. Baker, Jr., Nationalizing Criminal Law: Does Organized Crime Make It Necessary or
Proper?, 16 RUTGERS L.J 495, 502-18 (1985); see also S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1979);
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(c) (1978); Norman Abrams, Consultant's Report on Jurisdiction,
in I WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
(1970) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]; Roser A. Pauley, An Analysis of Some Aspects of Jurisdiction
Under S. 1437, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 475 (1979).
36. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has warned repeatedly of the dangers of expanding the
Federal Criminal Code. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 2-3. Rehnquist's concern regarding the
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statutes that include provisions to address a felony that results in death."
The text of these provisions does not appear to require proof of a culpable
mens rea. In October of 1992, for example, Congress passed the "Anti Car
Theft Act of 1992" and made carjacking a federal crime.38 Carjacking is the
taking of a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another by force and
violence or intimidation while possessing a firearm.39 The carjacking statute
contains a provision allowing a sentence of life imprisonment if a death
results during the offense.4" This provision parrots provisions in many
federal crimes that hold the offender responsible for a resultant death.
Arson,4 1 bank robbery,42 aircraft piracy,43 drug robberies," and a host of
other statutes45 all contain similar "if death results" provisions. These are
representative of markedly different homicide statutes that impose criminal
liability without textually requiring proof of culpability with respect to the
homicide element. These statutes almost uniformly permit a sentence of life
imprisonment," the same punishment for a conviction under the federal
murder statute, when a death results.
Statutes containing "if death results" provisions are so similar to felony-
murder provisions that courts should treat them as mere extensions of the
federalization of state crime is shared by the Judicial Conference. Judge Vincent Broderick, chairman
of the Judicial Conference's Committee on Criminal Law, has taken the unusual step of writing directly
to the members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees to notify them of the Committee's "long-
standing position in opposition to the unnecessary expansion of federal jurisdiction into areas that
traditionally have been within the province of the state courts." Congress Continues Federalization
Efforts, THE THiUW BRANCH, May 1992, at 4. Robert D. Raven, 1988 and 1989 ABA President, has
written that the "caseload crisis" in federal courts is due to the federalization of criminal law and that
the federalization of criminal law is a result of political posturing.
Because being tough on crime plays well at the ballot box, federal politicians in both the
legislative and executive branches have embarked on a well-publicized war against crime. To
be a front-page player in this war, they have substantially expanded the Federal Criminal Code,
essentially creating an entire body of law that duplicates state criminal codes.
Robert D. Raven, Don't Wage War on Crime in Federal Courts, TEX. LAW., Aug. 31, 1992, at 13.
37. Many of these statutes are based on felonies not mentioned in the federal felony-murder statute.
For example, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1988) covers air piracy-an offense which is not mentioned in 18
U.S.C. § I111.
38. Pub. L. No. 102-519, § 101, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3384 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2119).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. IV 1992). One court has struck down the statute, holding that the Anti
Car Theft Act lacks a rational nexus to interstate commerce. United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242
(M.D. Tenn. 1993).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3).
41. Id. § 844(i) (statute on which government relied when convicting Dale Ryan).
42. Id. § 2113(e) (1988).
43. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2118(c)(2) (1988).
45. See e.g., id. §§ 32 (destruction of aircraft facilities), 33 (destruction of motor vehicles), 241
(conspiracy against rights), 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law), 245(b) (federally protected
activities), 247(c)(1) (damage to religious property or interference with free exercise of religious beliefs),
844(i) (dealing in explosives), 1365(a)(2) (tampering with consumer products), 1716(i)(2) (mailing
injurious article), 1864(b)(1) (hazardous or injurious devices on federal land); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)
(manufacture, distribution, or dispensing controlled or counterfeit substances), 960(b)(l)-(3)
(importing/exporting drugs) (1988).
46. Some of the statutes go further and call for the death penalty in certain circumstances. See, e.g.,-
18 U.S.C. §§ 34 (setting forth penalties for violation of § 32 or § 33), 844(i), 1716(i)(2) (1988).
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felony-murder rule.47 Accordingly, to use these statutes to sentence a
defendant for felony murder courts first must find a culpable mens rea
("malice aforethought") for the death element of the crime.
C. Mens Rea and Judicial Gloss
One principle of statutory interpretation directs courts to prefer a meaning
that satisfies constitutional scrutiny.48 Compliance with this principle results
in a judicial "gloss" upon the law. Federal courts should interpret statutes with
"if death results" provisions as requiring proof of a resultant death and a
culpable mens rea with respect to the resultant death. This interpretation
would recognize the practical treatment accorded these statutes by defendants
and the Government. 49 This interpretation would also parallel the treatment
of these statutes by several federal courts. One example would be 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(e), the federal bank robbery statute. As Ryan's counsel argued:
Significant also is the recognition by federal courts that prosecutions
for homicides committed during federal bank robberies pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2113(e) are instances of "murder" or "felony murder" and
therefore require proof of mens rea relating to any resulting deaths .... Of
particular note is [the Eighth Circuit's] apparent recognition that the
homicide provision of § 2113(e) requires proof of intent to kill during the
course of a bank robbery.50
The federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), is emblematic of the
statutes containing "if death results" provisions, because the plain language
of the statute appears to require proof of the resultant death and does not
appear to require proof of mens rea. Because this statute and all other statutes
containing "if death results" provisions are essentially felony-murder statutes,
however, courts should interpret them consistently with the actual federal
47. See infra part I.C.
48. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). "'When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."'
Id. at 348 (Brandeis J., concurring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
49. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
50. Brief for Appellant at 49, United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-
1357) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The cases cited in the Ryan brief discuss § 2113(e) as
a "murder" or "felony-murder" offense. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 756 F.2d 703, 706 (9th Cir.
1985); United States v. Etheridge, 424 F.2d 951, 962 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000
(1971); United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966).
Labelling § 2113(e) as a "murdef' or "felony-murder" offense may be nothing more than the sloppy use
of terms of art. It may also be indicative, however, of the over-extension of the federal felony-murder
rule. When courts interpret the statute to require proof of intent to kill during the course of a bank
robbery, see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 678 F.2d 102, 105-06 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Delay,
500 F.2d 1360, 1362-64 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that proof of homicide requires proof of culpability),
they are placing a judicial gloss on the language of the statute. This action is important regardless of
whether the courts do so consciously or subconsciously.
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felony-murder statute. Interpreting "resulting in death" provisions such that
"malice aforethought" and even the death itself are not elements would allow
punishment tantamount to that permitted for a conviction of murder, but
predicated on substantially less proof.5' Ryan's counsel argued:
There must, at a minimum, be a rational basis for Congress to have
permitted a person to be exposed to the death penalty or to life imprison-
ment under Section 844(i) upon less proof than Congress required under
Sections 1111 and 2113(e). There is no rational explanation, however, for
imposing strict liability for arson related deaths in applications of Section
844(i) when arson related deaths under Section 1111 must be established
by proof of malice aforethought. 2
Ryan's counsel proceeded on the assumption that the death was an element
of the offense, because discussion of the consequences of a resulting death is
present in the language of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and the Fifth Circuit had so
recognized only two years earlier.53 In addition, the Government actually
charged the death in the indictment and spent "considerable efforts during the
course of the trial to prove these elements to the jury. ' 54 Ryan's counsel
argued that § 844(i) violated the Equal Protection Clause because there was
no reason to allow equivalent punishments for 18 U.S.C. § 1111 and 18
U.S.C. § 844(i) if § 1111 required proof of malice aforethought and § 844(i)
did not. This argument is even more convincing if one accepts, as the Eighth
Circuit did, that the death of another person is not an element of § 844(i).
In assessing a similar issue in United States v. LaFleur,5 the Ninth Circuit
held that 21 U.S.C. § 848(e), "which provides for a sentence of between
twenty years and death for a defendant convicted of intentional murder in
furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise,"56 does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. LaFleur was convicted of first-degree murder under 18
U.S.C. § 1111(a) and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment
under 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b).57 In contrast, a death that results from a
continuing criminal enterprise does not carry a life sentence. LaFleur,
therefore, argued that his sentence violated the Equal Protection Clause
because "by virtue of 1111(b)'s mandatory life sentence, [he was] being
treated differently than similarly situated defendants under § 848(e)."5 8
51. Discussed more fully infra part II.B.2.
52. Brief for Appellant at 50-51, Ryan (No. 92-1357). The brief cites several cases in support of
the statement. See United States v. LaFleur, 952 F.2d 1537, 1547-48 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 788 n,4 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2895 (1991); United States
v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1151, 1170-74 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
53. United States v. Tripplett, 922 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2245
(1991); see also supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
54. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Ryan (No. 92-1357). "The government's concentration on these
elements during the trial fills at least 50 pages of transcript. If these matters were material only to
sentencing, then the presentation of such evidence at trial would have been logically irrelevant to the
question of guilt or innocence under Federal Rule of Evidence 401." Id. at 2 n.l.
55. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1292 (1993).
56. Id. at 211-12.
57. Id. at 203.
58. Id. at 212.
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The Ninth Circuit rejected LaFleur's argument and found that Congress had
a rational basis for prescribing different punishments.5 9 The rationality of
this difference, however, rested on the fact that "§ 848(e), which covers
persons who have various roles in a murder, covers a broader range of
culpability than does § 111 (a), which attaches only to the actual killer."60
Thus, it made sense that Congress would seek greater latitude in punishment
when a greater range of culpability was covered. By contrast, the Government
may accomplish the same punishment under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) as it can under
§ 111 (a) without the same proof because on its face § 844(i) requires less
proof of culpability. 6' After Ryan, it does not require the government to
prove to the jury at trial that the defendant caused the death or that a death
occurred at all. Though 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) covers a range of punishment, the
Sentencing Guidelines eliminate this range of punishment when a death
results. It would be rational for § 844(i) to have a narrower range of
punishment because it requires proof of a lower level of mens rea.
Interpreting statutes with "if death results" provisions to include a resulting
death and "malice aforethought" as elements eliminates any equal protection
problem. Without placing this judicial gloss on the law, the "if death results"
provisions would permit a defendant to be sentenced for murder without so
much as a showing of mere negligence with respect to the death.62 Failure
to place this judicial gloss on the law also fails to respect the Rule of Lenity.
In Morissette v. United States,6 3 the Supreme Court pronounced that mens
rea, in this case intent to take another's property, was a necessary element of
larceny.64 The Court stated that common-law offenses65 such as larceny
were distinguishable from regulatory offenses:
Congressional silence as to mental elements in an Act merely
adopting into federal statutory law a concept of crime already so well
defined in common law and statutory interpretation by the states may
warrant quite contrary inferences than the same silence in creating an
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. This assertion assumes that the district court judge in Ryan was correct in his interpretation.
62. See Brief for Appellant at 28, United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1992) (No. 92-
1357) (quoting statement of trial judge):
I do not see a foreseeability requirement in the statutes. The statute simply refers to the conduct
resulting in death, and I think that means just that. Whether such deaths are foreseeable or not,
the only question is did the conduct actually result in the deaths, so I don't think that the
foreseeability on the part of the defendant at the time is an element of the death issue.
This statement by the trial judge does not reach as far as the Eighth'Circuit's decision in Ryan. The
district court judge at least felt that the death was an element whereas the Eighth Circuit held that the
death of another person was not an element. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 at *9. Part IV of this Note argues
that the consequences of creating a scheme that allows the death of another person to be a sentencing
factor violates the Due Process Clause.
63. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
64. Id. at 263.
65. Common-law offenses included offenses "such as those against the state, the person, property,
or public morals." Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
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offense new to general law, for whose definition the courts have no
guidance except the Act.66
The Court, therefore, refused to extend the doctrine of strict liability to
common-law crimes.
Courts should also refuse to extend the doctrine of strict liability to these
new extensions of the felony-murder rule. Felony-murder offenses, of all
types, are not mere regulatory offenses. Federal courts do not need to go as
far back as common law to interpret these new "if death results" statutes.
Federal criminal law already defines felony murder in such a way that the
death and "malice aforethought" for the death are elements of the offense.
Thus, new extensions of the felony-murder rule statutes are not "new to
general law," but merely "adopt[] into federal statutory law a concept of
crime already so well defined"67 in federal statutory law at 18 U.S.C. §
111l(a).
Morissette is an application of the Rule of Lenity, a commonly accepted
canon of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court has recognized that
when interpreting criminal statutes, the Court should resolve ambiguities in
favor of the defendant.6" The language of the "if death results" statutes by
definition discusses a resulting death and is at worst ambiguous as to whether
a resulting death is an element of the offense. The conclusion that the "if
death results" provisions are sentencing factors is clearly "inconsistent with
the settled rule that ambiguities in criminal statutes are to be resolved in favor
of the defendant, under the Rule of Lenity."69 The conclusion that these
statutes do not require proof of malice aforethought is also inconsistent with
the Rule of Lenity.
This [Supreme] Court, in keeping with the common-law tradition and
with the general injunction that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity," has on a number
of occasions read a state-of-mind component into an offense even when the
statutory definition did not in terms so provide. Indeed, the holding in
Morissette can be fairly read as establishing, at least with regard to crimes
having their origin in the common law, an interpretetative presumption that
66. Id. at 262. The Morissette court also relied on the Rule of Lenity to a certain degree. The rle
of lenity provides that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor
of lenity." Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
67. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 262.
68. "The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than
construction itself." United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820). Yet, while the Rule
of Lenity is an "ancient maxim," it is not obsolete or academic. See, eg., United States v. R.L.C., 112
S. Ct.°1329, 1338 (1992); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); Williams v. United
States, 458 U.S. 279, 290 (1982); McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 658 (1982); United States
v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971). The Rule of
Lenity may even apply to statutes that provide both civil and criminal penalties. See, e.g., United States
v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2110 (1992) (applying the Rule of Lenity to a statute
which taxed anyone who "makes" a firearm because the statute also provided criminal sanctions); see
also Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy, Lenity, and the Statutory Interpretation of Cognate Civil and
Criminal Statutes, 69 IND. LJ. 335 (1994) (arguing against extending the Rule of Lenity to the
Bankruptcy Code).
69. United States v. Ryan, 1993 WIL 429092, at *15 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, CJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
1994]
1NDIANA LAW JOURNAL
mens rea is required. "[M]ere omission ... of intent [in the statute] will
not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced";
instead Congress will be presumed to have legislated against the back-
ground of our traditional legal concepts which render intent a critical
factor, and "absence of contrary direction [will] be taken as satisfaction
with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them."70
Congress has legislated against the background of federal felony murder, for
which both a resulting death and malice aforethought are elements. They
should also be elements of these "if death results" offenses.
D. The Constitution and Mens Rea:
Substantive Due Process Problems
While the Supreme Court has ceded power to the state legislatures to enact
felony-murder statutes, 71 none of its holdings have definitively assessed the
constitutionality of a murder statute that goes beyond strict liability.72 These
new statutes go beyond strict liability because, under the Ryan interpretation,
they do not require proof of culpability, proof that the victim died, or proof
that the defendant caused the death.
The Supreme Court has held that the government must prove each element
of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.73 Thus, how a legislature defines
an offense determines which elements the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Court has also recognized that there are limits to a
legislature's power to define an offense,74 stating that "in certain limited
circumstances ... [the] reasonable-doubt requirement applies to facts not
formally identified as elements of the offense charged."'75 A legislature's
definition of the elements of an offense and the burden of proof necessary to
establish such an offense may violate the Due Process Clause by "'offend[ing]
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.' 76 The nature of these new felony-
murder offenses violates the Due Process Clause by avoiding the requirement
70. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (citations omitted); see
also Liparto v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
71. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978) (Burger, C.J., joined by three Justices) ('That
states have authority ... , as a matter of law, ... to enact felony-murder statutes is beyond
constitutional challenge.").
72. See, e.g., Territory of Guam v. Root, 524 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1076 (1976); Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 449 n.16.
73. The constitutional guarantee of due process requires that the prosecution prove beyond a
reasonable doubt those elements that the legislature has included in the definition of the charged offense.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85
(1986) (citing Patterson); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("The Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
74. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 211 n.12.
75. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86.
76. Id. at 85 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)).
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of proving a death and mens rea for the death" if these new felony-murder
statutes do not include the death and malice aforethought as elements of the
offense of conviction.
Even assuming that a death is an element of the offense, either Congress
has created a strict liability offense such that the felony-murder provision no
longer requires the government to prove "intent or malice aforethought," or
the Sentencing Commission has presumed the existence of "malice afore-
thought" once the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt the
commission of a felony and the fact of the resulting death. If the Guidelines
presume malice aforethought, the defendant would still be able to rebut such
a presumption by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she
did not possess a culpable mens rea for the killing."8 Failure to do so,
however, would result in a conviction for felony murder. The different
evidentiary standard at sentencing would then allow the defendant to mitigate
the sentence by proving lack of a culpable mens rea by a preponderance of the
evidence.79 Nelson E. Roth and Scott E. Sundby argue that both of these
alternative conceptions of the felony-murder doctrine fail constitutional
analysis.80
77. While Part I.D. of this Note applies a due process analysis to federal statutes, the arguments
made also apply to general felony-murder doctrine, not merely to the federal felony-murder rule.
78. See infra part II.A. (noting that in the Sentencing Guidelines' scheme, the defendant bears the
burden of proving mitigating factors to establish a downward departure).
79. This idea is supported by the language of the first application note to U.S.S.G. § 2Al.
80. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 478. The Roth & Sundby article draws much of its argument
from, and is essentially consistent with, a previous article on the burden of proof in criminal law. John
C. Jeffries & Paul B. Stephan HI, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law,
88 YALE L.L 1325 (1979). Jeffries and Stephan perceive two constitutional concerns with the burden
of proof and elements of an offense as defined by the legislature. The procedural aspect requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1328-44. The substantive aspect controls the limits of legislative power
to define crime and punishment. Id. at 1356-65; see also C. Peter Erlinder, Mens Rea, Due Process, and
the Supreme Court: Toward a Constitutional Doctrine of Substantive Criminal Law, 9 AM. J. CalM. L.
163, 165 (1981) ("[Common law concept[] of criminal culpability,... [meaning] concurrence of mens
rea and actus reus in the definition of crime[,] is the very essence of due process in the Anglo-American
legal tradition.") (emphasis in original); Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States
Constitution: Substantive Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1571, 1573 (1978) (taking
the position that a constitutional rule of substantive due process forbids strict criminal liability). But see
United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495, 1499 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The [Supreme] Court has declined to
use the due process clause to substantively shape criminal laws, opting instead to defer to legislative
definitions of crime.').
Satisfaction of both the procedural and the substantive aspects is necessary and demanded by the
Supreme Court's decisions.
In point of fact, a constitutional stricture against shifting the burden of proof would not prevent
the injustice of unwarranted or disproportionate criminal punishment. It would withdraw from
legislative choice certain procedural options, but it would not address the real evil of
substantive disproportionality in the assignment of criminal penalties.
Jeffries & Stephan, supra at 1358. The real evil of the felony-murder doctrine is that it allows the
legislature to define crime such that there is a disproportionately high punishment in light of the absence
of a burden of proving mens rea for murder. This argument is the point of departure for the Roth and
Sundby article and supports the notion that the Sentencing Guidelines' use of a preponderance of
evidence standard in assessing mens rea for deaths resulting from commission of felonies is improper
in light of the fact that satisfaction of the standard carries a term of life imprisonment. See infra part
IV.
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1. Strict Liability
Roth and Sundby believe that construing the felony-murder doctrine so that
it creates a strict liability offense is unconstitutional because it violates both
the Eighth Amendment guarantee against disproportionate punishment and the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.8 The Eighth Amendment analysis
dictated by Enmund v. Florid82 "focuses on the illegitimacy of imposing
severe punishments where the trier of fact is not required to find culpability
that would justify the sanctions. According to this analysis, the felony-murder
rule with its disregard of the defendant's culpability is invalid.8 3
Roth and Sundby cite United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 4 in
support of their argument that due process limits a "legislature's power to
eliminate a mens rea element ... [for] regulatory crime[s] not recognized at
the common law .... "85 Further support for the notion that a strict liability
murder statute violates principles of due process comes from United States v.
Bailey,86 where the Court stated that "'strict liability' crimes are exceptions
to the general rule that criminal liability requires an 'evil-meaning mind'
8
and that "'[c]lear analysis requires that the question of the kind of culpability
required to establish the commission of an offense be faced separately with
respect to each material element of the crime."'' 8 8 Roth and Sundby argue
that a strict liability felony-murder rule "violates this principle, as it fails to
distinguish between the mens rea required for murder and the intent to commit
a felony. '89 The same problem results if malice aforethought is not an
element of these "if death results" statutes.
81. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 478-91.
82. Enmund, 458 U.S. 782, 788-801 (1982) (holding that imposing the death penalty upon an
individual convicted of felony murder, but who was not a "triggerman," constituted cruel and unusual
punishment).
83. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 485.
84. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
85. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 487. The Third Circuit has stated that the Guidelines do not
violate the presumption against strict liability in criminal law even though the "Commission has
intentionally imposed strict liability" for possessing a stolen firearm. United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d
450, 453 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a two-level enhancement of sentence for possession of stolen
firearm does not require scienter under § 2K2.1(b)(2)). The Mobley decision rested on the fact that
enhancement based on possession of a stolen firearm was a regulatory measure affecting the interests
of public health, safety, and welfare. Id. Such a distinction is entirely consistent with Roth and Sundby's
argument that strict liability is only proper for regulatory offenses. This distinction is also consistent
with Supreme Court doctrine. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text; infra part H.A.2.
86. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
87. Id. at 404 n.4; see also Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800 ("American criminal law has long considered
a defendant's intention-and therefore his moral guilt-to be critical to 'the degree of [his] criminal
culpability' .... ") (citation omitted).
88. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 406 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmts. at 123 (Tentative Draft No.
4, 1955)).
89. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 491; cf infra parts II.A.-B. (noting that the Sentencing
Commission did not distinguish between the mens rea for "felony murder" and the intent to commit a
felony until sentencing).
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2. Conclusive Presumption
Operation of the felony-murder rule as a conclusive presumption shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant and relieves the government of its burden of
proving every statutory element of an offense. 90 Such a shift of the burden
of proof violates the guarantees of the Due Process Clause as interpreted by
the Supreme Court.9'
Roth and Sundby rely on a line of cases culminating in Sandstrom v.
Montana.92 Sandstrom explicitly held that conclusive presumptions are
unconstitutional because they relieve the government of the burden of proving
an essential element of the offense, the defendant's intent.93 Since the
presumption of innocence "'extends to every element of the crime,"'' 94 the
felony-murder doctrine is unconstitutional because it "completely bypasses the
presumption of innocence as to this [mens rea] element upon proof of a
different element, the occurrence of a killing during the commission of a
felony." ' In addition, the doctrine unconstitutionally interferes with the fact-
finding function of the jury. 96 "[T]he jury is allowed only to deliberate on
whether a killing occurred during the commission of a felony. Upon its
finding of that fact, the rule requires the jury to find automatically that the
defendant had a culpable state of mind."97
Roth and Sundby's position with regard to presumptions finds support in the
context of sentencing schemes in the Supreme Court's decision in McMillan
v. Pennsylvania." In McMillan, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania sentencing
90. See, Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 460-78. I have limited the discussion of the Roth and
Sundby argument as much as possible. The Roth and Sundby article focuses on the constitutional
propriety of the felony-murder rule generally. This Note addresses the operation of the federal felony-
murder doctrine, as it has been codified, and its relationship to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
91. Id. at 469-71.
92. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). Prior to Sandstrom, the Court had held that "the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). The Court reaffirmed the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977), Mullaney was
interpreted to mean that a state may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant with respect to a fact
that is statutorily required to be proven by the prosecution.
93. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520-24 (stating that a jury instruction that the law presumes a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts served as an unconstitutional presumption of
intent and shifted the burden to the defendant with regard to mens rea of an element of the statute). In
light of the fact that the jury could have viewed the instruction as merely shifting the burden of
persuasion of mens rea (rather than conclusively presuming mens rea), the Court addressed this
possibility and found it to be unconstitutional as well. Id. at 524. Therefore, the Sentencing Guidelines'
placement of the burden of proof on the defendant to prove mere negligence or recklessness should also
be deemed improper. See infra part II.A; infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
94. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 522 (emphasis in original) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 275 (1952)).
95. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 470 (emphasis in original) (drawing on the reasoning of
Sandstrom).
96. The fact-finding function of the jury and the burden of proof were both noted as guarantees of
the presumption of innocence in Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521-23; see also infra notes 165, 212-17 and
accompanying text (discussing fact-finding function of jury and due process).
97. Roth & Sundby, supra note 25, at 470.
98. McMillan, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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scheme that treated visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor,
rather than as an element of the offense. 99 The Court, however, noted that
a sentencing scheme that creates an improper presumption might violate due
process.'°
The subsequent Parts of this Note analyze the application of the felony-
murder doctrine in federal criminal law as it is interpreted by the Sentencing
Commission and implemented by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. If federal
courts interpret the "if death results" statute to include malice aforethought as
an element of the offense of conviction-as they should-then the problems
I raise will be avoided and it will not be necessary to assess the application
of the felony-murder doctrine at sentencing. The Government would not be
able to use the Sentencing Guidelines to avoid proving malice aforethought
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
In 1984, Congress established the United States Sentencing Commission to
reduce sentencing disparities.' The Sentencing Commission's work
culminated in the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
Sentencing Guidelines incorporate a form of the felony-murder doctrine to
determine sentences for offenses that result in death.0 2
Theoretically, the Sentencing Guidelines could apply the felony-murder rule
in either of two ways. The Guidelines could apply the felony-murder rule at
sentencing, as was done by the district court in Ryan, or the Guidelines could
assume that the felony-murder rule applies at the guilt/innocence stage and
that the resulting death and malice aforethought are elements of the offense,
as was argued in Part I. As written, the Sentencing Guidelines misinterpret the
federal felony-murder rule by applying it at the sentencing stage. As a result,
defendants are being sentenced as murderers even though they may not have
acted with "malice aforethought."
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Do Not Require Proof
of Malice Aforethought at the Guilt/Innocence Stage
The United States Sentencing Guidelines Commentary applicable to first-
degree murder reads:
Application Notes:
1. The Commission has concluded that in the absence of capital
punishment life imprisonment is the appropriate punishment for premeditat-
ed killing. However, this guideline also applies when death results from the
99. Id. at 84-91.
100. Id. at 87. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' use of the felony-murder doctrine may create just
such an improper presumption. See infra part II.B.
101. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1987, 2017-26 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 991-998 (West 1993)).
102. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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commission of certain felonies. Life imprisonment is not necessarily
appropriate in all such situations. For example, if in robbing a bank, the
defendant merely passed a note to the teller, as a result of which she had
a heart attack and died, a sentence of life imprisonment clearly would not
be appropriate.
If the defendant did not cause the death intentionally or knowingly,
a downward departure may be warranted. The extent of the departure
should be based upon the defendant's state of mind (e.g., recklessness or
negligence), the degree of risk inherent in the conduct, and the nature of
the underlying offense conduct. However, the Commission does not
envision that departure below that specified in § 2A1.2 (Second Degree
Murder) is likely to be appropriate. Also, because death obviously is an
aggravating factor, it necessarily would be inappropriate to impose a
sentence at a level below that which the guideline for the underlying
offense requires in the absence of death.'0 3
The Sentencing Commission clearly contemplated that courts would
sentence a convicted felon for felony murder even though he or she lacked
"malice aforethought" with respect to the death. 4 In doing so, the
Commission fundamentally misinterpreted the federal felony-murder rule,
which requires proof of "malice aforethought"-intent, knowledge, or extreme
recklessness-before there can be a conviction. The Sentencing Guidelines
attempt to temper the harshness of sentencing a defendant for murder when
the defendant lacked "malice aforethought" by allowing for a downward
departure based on the defendant's state of mind. Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, the defendant's state of mind is considered relevant conduct,0 5
and the defendant bears the burden of proving relevant conduct by a
preponderance of the evidence.0 6 Thus, the defendant bears the burden of
proving lack of a culpable mental state. The Guidelines entail mitigation if the
defendant is merely reckless or negligent.
103. U.S.S.G. § 2Al. cmt. n.1 (first-degree murder).
104. "If the defendant did not cause the death intentionally or knowingly, a downward departure may
be warranted." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, if a defendant is merely negligent or reckless or possesses
no culpable mens rea at all, the defendant is still punished for murder, but a downward departure is
warranted. "However, the Commission does not envision that departure below that specified in § 2A1.2
(Second Degree Murder) is likely to be appropriate." Id.
105. "Subsection (a)(4) [of Relevant Conduct] requires consideration of any other information
specified in the applicable guideline. For example,. . . the defendant's state of mind ..." Id. § lB 1.3
cmt (background). For a discussion of the definition and use of relevant conduct, see infra notes 171-74
and accompanying text.
106. United States v. Rodriguez, 896 F.2d 1031, 1032-33 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kirk, 894
F.2d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285,291 (3d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989).
[T]he burden of ultimate persuasion should rest upon the party attempting to adjust the
sentence. Thus, when the Government attempts to upwardly adjust the sentence, it must bear
the burden of persuasion . .. Conversely, when the defendant is attempting to justify a
downward departure, it is usually the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion.
McDowell, 888 F.2d at 291 (citations omitted). The Sentencing Commission concurs with the judgment
of these courts. 6 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, QUESTIONS MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED ABOUT THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 35 (December 1, 1992) (question 119) [hereinafter MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS]. The Sentencing Commission goes even further, however, by stating that "this does not
prevent the sentencing judge from taking an independent position that would result in a sentence
adjustment (enhancement or reduction) that was not argued by either party." Id.
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The Sentencing Commission must have assumed that the felony-murder
doctrine extended to the sentencing stage and that resulting deaths were
sentencing factors. If the Sentencing Commission had recognized that felony-
murder offenses include "malice aforethought" as an element of the offense,
the Sentencing Guidelines would then act to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant to prove a mental state that contravenes the mental state ("malice
aforethought") already proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the Government
at trial.
°7
While the Sentencing Guidelines direct court to sentence defendants
convicted of felony murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 pursuant to the guidelines
applicable to first-degree murder, the Sentencing Guidelines also encompass
sentencing for other felonies "if death results." The Guidelines state that
"[t]he Commission has concluded that in the absence of capital punishment
life imprisonment is the appropriate punishment for premeditated killing.
However, this guideline also applies when death results from the commission
of certain felonies.' 8 Thus, to conform most consistently with substantive
law, the Sentencing Guidelines must assume that "malice aforethought" is an
element of felony murder, but that those statutes with "if death results"
provisions do not include "malice aforeth6ught" as an element of the offense.
An analysis of some of the Guidelines applicable to statutes containing "if
death results" provisions reveals a fundamental error in the Sentencing
Guidelines.
B. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines That Are Applicable "Under
Circumstances That Would Constitute Murder .... "
The 1993 amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines added the
following language to the guidelines that are applicable to several of the "if
death results" statutes mentioned in U.S.S.G. § 2A1.L: "If a victim was killed
under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. Section
1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdic-
tion of the United States, apply Section 2Al (First Degree Murder)."'0 9
The circumstances that would constitute murder include proof of "malice
107. Proving "malice aforethought" at trial requires the Government to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant acted either with intent, knowledge, or extreme recklessness. Supra note 32.
108. U.S.S.G. § 2A.l cmt. n.l (emphasis added). A great number of the Guidelines contain
provisions for departure to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2AI.5(c)(l) (conspiracy or soliditation
to commit murder), 2A3.1(c)(l) (criminal sexual abuse), 2B3.1(c)(1) (robbery), 2B3.2(c)(1) (extortion
by force), 2DI.l(c)(1) (drug offenses), 2E2.1(c)(1) (extortionate extension or collection of credit),
2K1.3(c)(1)(B) (prohibited transactions involving explosive materials), 2K1.4(c)(I) (arson),
2K2.1 (c)(1)(B) (prohibited transactions involving firearms or ammunition), 2K2.5(c)(1)(B) (possession
of firearm in federal facility; possession or discharge of weapon in school zone), 2K3.2(a)(2)(feloniously mailing injurious articles), 2NI.I(c)(1) (tampering with consumer products); see also
Proposed Amendments, supra note 14, amend. 4.
109. U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1 (kidnapping, abduction, unlawful restraint) (emphasis added); see also id. §§
2A3.l(c)(1) (criminal sexual abuse), 2B3.1 (c)(l) (robbery), 2B3.2(c)(1) (extortion by force), 2DI.l(c)(1)
(drug offenses), 2E2. I (c)(l) (extortionate extension or collection of credit); ProposedAmendments, supra
note 14, amend. 4.
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aforethought" as part of the substantive offense. This language presumes that
some Guidelines' provisions that are applicable "if death results" require a
finding of "malice aforethought." But this language permits two interpreta-
tions. Either the Sentencing Guidelines assume that culpability is an element
of the offense of conviction and is determined at the guilt/innocence stage by
the jury, or the Sentencing Guidelines assume that culpability is a sentencing
factor and such a determination must be made by the judge at sentencing.
1. The Determination Is Made at the Guilt/Innocence Stage
The 1993 amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines added the
language regarding circumstances that would constitute murder to several
guidelines which previously did not require a finding that the killing resulted
under circumstances that would constitute murder. The commentary to the
amendments states that the "amendment adds cross references to Sections
2A3.1, 2B3.1, 2B3.2, 2D1.1, and 2E2.1 to address the circumstance in which
a victim is murdered during the offense."1  Under traditional federal law,
the jury determines at trial whether the offense is murder or not. Therefore,
the 1993 amendments, promulgated by the Sentencing Commission, might
express an understanding of this language that is consistent with traditional
federal felony-murder doctrine and the position supported by this Note. The
guideline applicable to murder, U.S.S.G. § 2Al.1, would be applicable only
if the defendant were found guilty of murder at the guilt/innocence stage.
Such a conviction would require a finding that the defendant acted with
malice aforethought.
2. The Determination Is Made at the Sentencing Stage
Under the alternative interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, all "if
death results" statutes entail a determination of the level of mens rea at
sentencing. This interpretation removes the determination of mens rea from
the jury, establishes a standard of preponderance of evidence rather than
beyond a reasonable doubt, and increases the prosecutor's discretion."' This
interpretation also usurps the jury's traditional role in determining the offense
of conviction and raises problems comparable to those problems endemic to
sentencing "by analogy..'.2
This interpretation.would be consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines'
language allowing a downward departure in cases where the defendant acted
recklessly or negligently. The 1993 amendments, however, make a life
sentence mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 1111.113 This means that in instances
110. Proposed Amendments, supra note 14, amend. 4 (emphasis added).
I11. See infra part IV.
112. See infra part III (advancing the argument that sentencing by analogy improperly allows the
judge to establish substantive law).
113. Proposed Amendments, supra note 14, amend. 3 (incorporating the uniform holding of appellate
courts that 18 U.S.C. § 111 provides a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment).
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where the Government has the greatest interest in prosecuting a crime," 4 the
statutes require greater proof. When the Government has the least interest,
much less proof is required. The following passage illustrates how this point
was argued by defense counsel in the Ryan appeal:
There must, at a minimum, be a rational basis for Congress to have
permitted a person to be exposed to the death penalty or to life imprison-
ment under Section 844(i) upon less proof than Congress required under
Sections 1111 and 2113(e) [bank robbery]. There is no rational explanation,
however, for imposing strict liability for arson related deaths in applica-
tions of Section 844(i) when arson related deaths under Section 1111 must
be established by proof of malice aforethought.
Even if the trial judge here had properly instructed the jury with
respect to the required foreseeability of the firefighters' deaths, the equal
protection violation would not have been avoided. There is no rational
basis for permitting a murder conviction and sentence to be based upon a
mere showing of negligence in cases where federal jurisdiction is premised
upon the Commerce Clause, but to require such convictions and sentences
to be based upon proof of intent, knowledge or extreme reckless[ness]
when federal jurisdiction is premised upon territorial, maritime or federal
banking interests.'
In addition to creating an equal protection problem, treating "if death
results" provisions as sentencing factors is inconsistent with other language
in the Sentencing Guidelines. Consider a case in which the jury convicts the
defendant of the simple felony of arson and the sentencing court finds that the
defendant in fact killed the victim with "malice aforethought." The Sentencing
Guidelines would apply U.S.S.G. § 2Al, which calls for a sentence of life
imprisonment. Importantly, life imprisonment exceeds the maximum penalty
for the underlying crime of arson.' 6 The Guidelines do allow for downward
departure "[i]f the defendant 'did not cause the death intentionally or
knowingly .... The extent of the departure should be based upon the
defendant's state of mind (e.g. recklessness or negligence) .... ""' But, to
depart to U.S.S.G. § 2Al, a court must have already found that the
defendant acted with "malice aforethought." Such a finding precludes a
departure based on recklessness or negligence. Thus, the Sentencing
Guidelines would never allow a downward departure, and the sentence would
exceed the maximum penalty. Federal courts should avoid an interpretation
that renders provisions in the Guidelines meaningless. Courts should prefer
an interpretation that applies the felony-murder rule at the guilt/innocence
stage.
The application of the felony-murder rule at sentencing raises another
problem because first-degree murder requires a mandatory minimum sentence
114. The Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § I 111,
so the federal interest is "greater."
115. Brief for Appellant at 50-51, United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-
1357) (citations omitted). Ryan's initial argument did not even address a circumstance where the death
itself was not an element of the offense. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
I 16. The simple arson felony has a maximum sentence of ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
117. U.S.S.G. § 2AI.I cmt. n.l.
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of life imprisonment." 8 A mandatory minimum life sentence does not allow
the sentencing judge to incorporate mitigation for a mens rea of recklessness
or negligence as is provided in the Sentencing Guidelines." 9 The language
at the end of the section confirms this: downward departure may be relevant
"in the event the defendant is convicted under a statute that expressly
authorizes a sentence of less than life imprisonment (for example, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2113(e), 2118(c)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 848(e))." 20 Both the Second and Third
Circuits have noticed this conflict in the language of the Sentencing
Guidelines, but neither court has addressed the problem.'
III. SENTENCING BY ANALOGY
Several of the Sentencing Guidelines call for departure by analogy from the
offense of conviction to the guideline applicable to murder. For example, the
district court judge in the Ryan case in essence sentenced Dale Ryan for first-
degree murder, using analogy. 2 2 Sentencing by analogy is improper for two
reasons. First, murder is not analogous to other felonies resulting in death
unless a jury determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted
with "malice aforethought." Second, sentencing by analogy requires federal
judges to establish the offense of conviction at the sentencing stage. Such an
act establishes substantive criminal law and violates either the separation of
powers doctrine or the delegation doctrine.
118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. The sentencing court has no discretion to impose
a sentence other than life in prison for first-degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111. "[Wjhoever is guilty
of murder in the first degree... shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life..s. " 18 U.S.C. § 111 (b);
see also United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 207-09 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. §
1111(b) mandates a minimum life sentence), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1292 (1993); United States v.
Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 741 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that life imprisonment is mandatory for first-degree
murder, but noting the conflict in the language allowing departure for defendant's merely reckless or
negligent state of mind in felony-murder deaths), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1528 (1990). See generally
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES] (Special Report to Congress directed
by § 1703 ofP. L. 101-647).
119. U.S.S.G. § 2A1.I, cmt. n.1 ("If the defendant did not cause the death intentionally or
knowingly, a downward departure may be warranted. The extent of the departure should be based upon
the defendant's state of mind (e.g., recklessness or negligence) .....
120. Id., cmt. (background) (referring to simple felony statutes).
121. United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1048-51 (2d Cir. 1991); Donley, 878 F.2d at 739-41.
The Third Circuit deferred addressing the problem, stating:
Therefore, under the normal Sentencing Guidelines procedure, as well as the underlying statute,
the court had but one sentencing option: life imprisonment. We note that the commentary to
§ 2Al.l raises the question whether life imprisonment is necessarily appropriate in a case in
which the defendant did not knowingly or willingly cause the death. In the example given, the
defendant, a bank robber, passes a note to a teller, who, as a result, dies of a heart attack. This
court need not address here the issue of whether, in a different case, the District Court would
be compelled to impose a life sentence for first degree murder.
Id. at 741 n.14.
122. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1993) (92-1357).
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A. Murder Is Not Analogous Unless the Defendant
Acts with Malice Aforethought
If the prosecution does not prove mens rea with respect to the death at the
guilt/innocence stage in cases predicated on statutes with "if death results"
provisions, it is difficult to see how U.S.S.G. § 2Al (First Degree Murder)
can be the most analogous provision, as the district judge decided in Dale
Ryan's case. Murder is clearly not analogous to an arson resulting in death
because murder requires proof of "malice aforethought." This notion was
somehow lost on the Sentencing Commission. The guideline for 18 U.S.C. §
844(i), the federal arson statute under which Ryan was convicted, states: "If
death resulted, or the offense was intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury, apply the most analogous guideline from Chapter Two, Part A
(Offenses Against the Person) if the resulting offense level is greater than that
determined above."' Thus, the Guidelines prescribed the Ryan judge's use
of analogy.
The Sentencing Guidelines actually direct the judge to sentence a defendant
under the guideline applicable to murder in any case in which a death resulted
and the defendant "used or possessed any firearm or dangerous weapon in
connection with the commission or attempted commission of another offense
.... 124 In essence, the Sentencing Guidelines direct a categorical departure
to the guideline applicable to murder, rather than asking for a thoughtful
analysis to determine what is the most analogous provision.
In Schad v. Arizona,125 a plurality of the Supreme Court,1 6 held that a
jury does not need to make a specific finding of premeditated murder or
felony murder to convict a defendant of murder because the depravity of mind
required for premeditated murder and felony murder is morally equiva-
lent. 27 Thus, for the Court, Arizona's felony murder offense was really the
123. U.S.S.G. § 2KI.4(c)(1); see also id. §§ 2KI.3(c)(1)(B) (unlawful transactions involving
explosive materials), 2K2.1(c)(1)(B) (unlawfiil transactions involving firearms or ammunition),
2K2.5(c)(1)(B) (possession of firearm in federal facility or school zone).
124. Id. § 2K2.5(c)(1). "[I]f death resulted, [apply] the most analogous offense guideline from
Chapter Two, Part A, Subpart I (Homicide) .... Id. § 2K2.-5(c)(l)(B).
125. Schad, III S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
126. Justice Scalia concurred only in the result, not the plurality's reasoning. Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
127. Id. at 2503-04. The authors of one article have argued:
Felony murder reflects a societal judgment that an intentionally committed robbery that causes
the death of a human being is qualitatively more serious than an identical robbery that does
not.... Thus the felony murder doctrine reflects the conclusion that a robbery that causes
death is more closely akin to murder than to robbery.
Crump & Crump, supra note 28, at 363. The premise for the Crumps' assertion (that the felony murder
doctrine accurately reflects societal attitudes) is by no means clear. It has been called into question by
empirical evidence. See Norman J. Finkel & Kevin B. Duff, Felony-Murder and Community Sentiment:
Testing the Supreme Court's Assertions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 405 (1991). The assertion is also
weak because the felony-murder doctrine's genesis occurred in an age when all felonies were punishable
by death. For all practical purposes, it made no difference whether one was convicted of murder or the
underlying felony because the punishment was the same. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 31,
n.74 (1980).
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same offense as first-degree murder. The plurality's decision rested on the
notion that a defendant convicted of premeditated murder has the same
culpability as a defendant convicted of felony murder. Justice Souter stated:
If, then, two mental states are supposed to be equivalent means to
satisfy the mens rea element of a single offense, they must reasonably
reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or culpability, whereas a
difference in their perceived degrees of culpability would be a reason to
conclude that they identified different offenses altogether. 8
The Sentencing Guidelines proceed on the theory that a defendant convicted
of arson does not have the same culpability as one convicted of "murder." 
129
Under the Commission's interpretation, the elements that the government must
establish to support a jury verdict of arson are different than the elements of
felony murder, thus delineating two distinct offenses of conviction. The two
offenses require proof of different levels of mens rea13 ' and are punishable
by different sentences.' 3' Arson and felony murder are not analogous and
constitute "different offenses altogether."' 32 The use of relevant conduct at
sentencing should not blur this distinction and make the two offenses
analogous.
One might argue that departure to U.S.S.G. § 2A is analogous because it is
applicable to other offenses besides first-degree and second-degree murder.
For instance, the sentencing ranges for convictions under the federal statute
for voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter'33 fall within
"Chapter Two, Part A."'34 In addition, neither voluntary nor involuntary
While I do not agree with this assertion, I agree that the creation of new offenses such as "robbery-
resulting-in-death" would be improper because it would increase prosecutorial discretion. Crump &
Crump, supra note 28, at 363. The Eighth Circuit's holding in Ryan creates this new offense, arson-
resulting-in-death. United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1993).
128. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2503 (emphasis in original) (Souter, J., plurality).
129. See supra part II.A. Under the Eighth Circuit's interpretation, the death is not even at issue at
trial. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092.
130. Felony murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 requires proof of "malice aforethought" which precludes
the prosecution from convicting a defendant who is merely negligent or reckless. The Sentencing
Guidelines provide for the felony-murder doctrine's application in a scenario where the defendant is
merely negligent or reckless. Supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
131. First-degree murder carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment under the Sentencing
Guidelines. Arson does not. See supra part II.B.2.
132. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2503. The Schad Court easily could have been speaking to the proliferation
of felony-murder offenses when it stated that the Due Process Clause would limit a state's ability to
"convict anyone under a charge of 'Crime' so generic that any combination of jury findings of
embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering, for example, would suffice
for conviction." Id. at 2497-98. I do not intend to imply that the federal statutes I have discussed are
as generic as "Crime," but the Court's statement was also not flip. In the following footnote the Court
clarified:
Although our vagueness cases support the notion that a requirement of proof of specific illegal
conduct is fundamental to our system of criminal justice, the principle is not dependent upon
or limited by concerns about vagueness. A charge allowing a jury to combine findings of
embezzlement and murder would raise identical problems regardless of how specifically
embezzlement and murder were defined.
Id. at 2498 n.4 (emphasis added). The Ryan court's interpretation raises this issue.
133. Id.
134. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2AI.3 (voluntary manslaughter), 2A1.4 (involuntary manslaughter).
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manslaughter requires "malice aforethought" for a death. But voluntary
manslaughter occurs only "[u]pon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion" and
involuntary manslaughter occurs "[i]n the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony .. "..135 The Sentencing Guidelines' own language
declares that in sentencing for a death, "the Commission does not envision
that departure below that specified in § 2A1.2 (Second Degree Murder) is
likely to be appropriate. "136
The Sentencing Commission was not seeking uniformity of sentences based
on culpability. The Commission was simply seeking uniform severity of
sentences. The language of the Guidelines calls for departure to Chapter Two,
Part A only "if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined" by
the guideline for the offense of conviction. 37 Thus, the Guidelines do not
ask for a thoughtful analogy, they direct a departure by analogy any time a
death results-not simply when murder is the most analogous provision.'
The district court judge in Ryan may have applied the Guidelines in a manner
consistent with the Sentencing Commission's purpose, nevertheless, the
application is unconstitutional.
B. Sentencing by Analogy Is Unconstitutional
In 1984, Congress established the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
promulgate new sentencing guidelines.'3 In adopting the Sentencing
Guidelines, "Congress ... assented to virtually all of the Commission's
guidelines and amendments by silence." 4' The Supreme Court has ruled that
the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines was constitutional and is binding
on the courts.' 4' In Mistretta v. United States, 142 the Supreme Court held
that the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines was neither an excessive
delegation of legislative power nor a violation of the separation of powers
principle. 4 3 While the Guidelines generally satisfy constitutional scrutiny,
the Court did not address specific provisions of the Guidelines. Furthermore,
the Court based its holding upon the fact that the Sentencing Guidelines did
"not include sentences in excess of the statutory maxima '"" and the
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (emphasis added).
136. U.S.S.G. § 2At.l, cmt. n.1. Even second-degree murder is "murder," requiring proof of"malice
aforethought."
137. See, e.g., id. § 2K1.4(c)(1) (arson).
138. The argument that the Commission intended the departure by analogy to be discretionary is
foreclosed by the Commission's own opinion. When asked, "Are the cross references in Chapter Two
guidelines optional?" the Commission answered "No." MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra
note 106, at 46 (question 148).
139. Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
140. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1696 (1992).
141. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 412.
144. Id. at 375. The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Restrepo that "a convicted defendant has
an interest in the accurate application of the Guidelines within statutory limits, nothing more, nothing
less." United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Restrepo II), cert. denied,
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Guidelines did not supplant the underlying statute for any offense.1 4' The
Sentencing Guidelines may not create new offenses and may not exceed the
statutory maxima. 146 The Sentencing Guidelines use of departure by analogy
is distinguishable from the Mistretta decision because the Sentencing
Guidelines actually allow a judge to establish the offense of conviction at the
sentencing stage. Sentencing by analogy permits a judge to establish
substantive criminal law. Judicial legislation violates either the separation or
delegation of powers doctrine.
The Sentencing Guidelines "provide specific guidance for departure by
analogy" 4 7 in authorizing "a court to depart from a guideline-specified
sentence" when it feels that there are especially significant aggravating factors
that are not accounted for by the Guidelines. 48 When a judge sentences a
defendant by analogy, the judge defines the offense of conviction postfactum,
especially when the two offenses are in fact not analogous. 4 9 Departure by
analogy gives the Sentencing Commission and federal judges power to define
the offense of conviction after a conviction has occurred.' The policies of
the Rule of Lenity are germane and the rule should apply. "[B]ecause of the
seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually
represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not
courts should define criminal activity."'' The Ryan case is a poignant
112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992). Thus, it is key to know what each statute requires and under which statute each
offender has been convicted. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be required if the facts in issue
constitute a new or distinct crime.
145. The Sentencing Guidelines describe the effect of statutorily required minimum sentences and
statutorily authorized maximum sentences on the specific guidelines in U.S.S.G. § 5G.lI; see also
United States v. Sharp, 883 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1989) ("When a statute requires a sentence different
than that set by the guidelines, the statute controls."); United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1528 (1990).
146. U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(a) ("Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the
minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the
guideline sentence.'); see also Donley, 878 F.2d at 740 (Congress did not intend to change the
sentencing provisions of existing law).
147. U.S.S.G. § 1A4(b) (departures).
148. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
149. Supra part II.A. Departure by analogy also denies a defendant fair notice and increases
prosecutorial discretion. These actions violate due process. See discussion infra part IV.B.4.
150. One commentator has described the importance of prescribing statutory maximums this way:
Grading offenses limits judicial discretion, and the accompanying possibility for judicial caprice
or prejudice, by involving a jury in confining the judge's sentencing options on conviction; if
a jury convicts the defendant only of second-degree murder or manslaughter, the judge is
deprived of certain sentencing options that we make available to the judge when the jury
convicts of first-degree murder.
Cole, supra note 24, at 107. The existence of limits on judicial sentencing discretion is not diminished
by the fact that a statutory offense degree still allows a great deal of sentencing discretion within one
degree. Even the Sentencing Guidelines allow discretion for a judge to depart from the guidelines'
sentence. Id. at 127 n.186. However, Cole uses this language to argue that including felony murder as
first-degree murder is beneficial because it allows the jury to distinguish between killings during crime
and "simple killings" (unrelated to crime) and thereby limit judicial sentencing discretion. This argument
is flawed (apart from the fact that it assumes that a jury will not want to distinguish between killings
during crime based upon the defendant's mens rea) because it fails to recognize that the Sentencing
Guideline's allowance of departure by analogy removes the statutory mandate of a jury's check on
judicial sentencing discretion.
151. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (citation omitted).
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example of such improper behavior. Either the judge established substantive
criminal law by creating a new federal offense through the use of analogy-a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine-or Congress, by creating a
generic category of "crime" with an infinite range of sentences, delegated to
the judiciary its power to establish substantive criminal law-a violation of
the delegation of powers doctrine.
1. Separation of Powers Doctrine
The Supreme Court has stated that the separation of governmental powers
is a fundamental constitutional principle"5 2 and is a vital and "self-executing
safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other."' 53 Thus, there is a special importance to maintaining
the independence of the branches.
Because the Constitution gives Congress the power to fix the sentence for
federal crimes,'54 the judiciary may not reassign to itself the power to fix
the sentence for federal crimes by analogy.'55 Judges have discretion to
choose a specific punishment within the range granted by Congress, but the
scope of judicial discretion is subject to the limits imposed by Congress. 56
Sentencing by analogy violates the separation of powers doctrine because the
legislature must define crime. An act the judicial branch has no power to do
is unconstitutional regardless of how carefully it is done. The fact that the
Sentencing Guidelines provide for judicial review of such departures and that
Congress assented to the delegation of power by adopting the Sentencing
Guidelines does not make them valid. 57
152. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725
(1986).
153. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).
154. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) ("It is the legislature, not the
Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment."); see also United States v. Hudson, I 1
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (implying that federal crimes are solely creatures of statute and that the
legislature is entrusted with the power to define the elements of a criminal offense).
155. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (reaffirming the belief that there is a
special danger when one branch accretes to itself the power of another branch).
156. ExParte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916); see also Chapman v. United States, 111 S.
Ct. 1919, 1928 (1991) ("Congress has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the
courts any sentencing discretion.").
157. In New York v. United States, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated:
The Constitution's division of powers among the three Branches is violated where one Branch
invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon Branch approves the
encroachment. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-37 (1976), for instance, the Court held that
the Congress had infringed the President's appointment power, despite the fact that the
President himself had manifested his consent to the statute that caused the infringement by
signing it into law.
New York, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2431 (1992) (citations omitted).
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2. Delegation of Power Doctrine
The Constitution also mandates that "[allU legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,"' 58 and the Supreme
Court has stated that Congress cannot delegate its legislative power to another
branch of the government.'59 Therefore, neither the Commission nor
Congress may give the judiciary the power to create new statutes or new
sentencing ranges for existing statutes. 60
If the Eighth Circuit is right, Congress may simply designate a generic
category of "Crime" with an infinite range of sentences and leave it up to the
judge to determine what the sentence is. If there are no limits on how
Congress may define crime, then the entire Federal Criminal Code could
arguably be mere sentencing enhancements. This legislative definition of a
generic "Crime" offense may violate the Due Process Clause by "'offend[ing]
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental."" 61 In the Ryan case, the judge was
"limited" by a range of zero years to life imprisonment. By requiring the
legislature to define crimes and fix their sentences, the Constitution protects
two interests. It mandates a diffusion of power and provides accountability for
governmental action. 62 "[I]f a given policy can be implemented only by a
combination of legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive
implementation, no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked
will."
63
The Sentencing Guidelines have been criticized harshly for expanding
prosecutorial discretion.'4 Departure by analogy defeats the diffusion of
power by allowing a prosecutor to charge a mere felony and bring in evidence
158. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
159. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). This Note does not dispute or ignore the Supreme
Court's recognition of Congress' broad ability to delegate power. For example, the Court has found that
Congress did not violate the nondelegation doctrine by delegating power to promulgate sentencing
guidelines for all federal criminal offenses to the independent Sentencing Commission. Mistretta, 488
U.S. at 371. Nevertheless, Mistretta did not address the constitutionality of allowing judges to establish
the offense of conviction at sentencing by analogy. In fact, the decision rested on the fact that "Congress
instructed the Commission that these sentencing ranges must be consistent with pertinent provisions of
Title 18 of the United States Code and could not include sentences in excess of the statutory maxima."
Id. at 374-75 (emphasis added).
160. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 378 n.l 1 (explaining that the Sentencing Commission could
include the death penalty within the guidelines only if the death penalty was authorized by Congress
in the statutory offense).
161. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
523 (1958)).
162. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381-82. The argument in favor of accountability is analogous to the
constitutional 'division of power between the Federal Government and the states. See generally New
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2424 (1992). Where the Federal Government compels the
Judiciary to define crimes, the accountability of both Congress and the Judiciary is diminished. The
Judiciary will "bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
[mandatory sentencing] program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision."
Id.
163..United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965).
164. See infra part IV.B.4.
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of the death at sentencing to bump the punishment exponentially. Departure
by analogy also disregards the importance of the fact-finding function of the
jury. The jury's fact-finding function assists the process of diffusing power
in a unique way. The jury may act as a societal check on the system by
acquitting a defendant of felony murder because the mens rea for murder did
not exist. Under the Sentencing Commission's system, the jury's check may
be disregarded by the prosecution, who possesses the power not to charge
certain conduct and then prove the conduct at sentencing where there exists
a lesser burden of proof. In essence, the prosecution may "impose its
unchecked will.'
165
Departure by analogy also defeats the goal of maintaining accountability.
Neither Congress nor the judiciary is accountable for sentences that result
from departure by analogy. Congress must pass the statutes and be account-
able to the electorate for the consequences of those statutes. Congress has an
interest in both being "tough on crime" and in protecting individual liber-
ties. 166 These are the two "crime" interests that are key to reelection. The
voters demand a balance between these two interests, and it is up to Congress
to strike the balance. The Sentencing Guidelines allow Congress to avoid
accountability. Because the Sentencing Commission does not have the
authority to enact new offenses, 67 the Sentencing Guidelines permit (and
165. Brown, 381 U.S. at 443. It is also important that the provisions calling for departure by analogy
when a death results direct the sentencing judge to depart to the guideline applicable to murder, § 2AI.
First-degree murder carries a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment. The Sentencing
Commission has stated:
In general, a mandatory minimum becomes applicable only when the prosecutor elects to
charge and the defendant is convicted of the specific offense carrying the mandatory sentence.
On the other hand, sentencing guidelines are more generic in nature and do not necessarily
require conviction of a particular charge for an aggravating factor to be reflected in the
sentence.
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 118, at 31-32 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Thus, the Sentencing Commission noted that there were important differences between mandatory
minimums and sentencing guidelines, but the use of departure by analogy actually incorporates
mandatory minimums into the Sentencing Guidelines. As' the Sentencing Commission acknowledged,
this raises serious questions about the evidentiary standard required by due process. "[I]ntertwined with
the charge-specific and conviction-predicate nature of mandatory minimums, is the more stringent,
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt evidentiary standard that generally must be met before many mandatory
minimums apply." Id. at 32; see also infra part IV (discussing how use of felony-murder doctrine at
sentencing, with the concomitant lower burden of proof, violates due process).
166. What should not be neglected is the defendant's interest in knowing the charges that are being
brought and the potential liability he faces.
It is a basic responsibility ofgovemment to assure that the criminal law is adequate to meet
both its abstract and its practical purposes. Certainly the law must set a standard, it must reflect
moral principles, it must provide fair notice of its provisions, and it must specify fair
procedures and just penalties for redressing its violation.
Ronald L. Gainer, Report to the Attorney General on Federal Criminal Code Reform, I CriM. L. F. 99,
112 (1989) (emphasis added) (discussing the need for, and the benefits of, Federal Criminal Code
reform).
167. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)-(x) (1988); supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text; see also S. REP.
No. 225,98th Cong., Ist Sess. 163 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,3346 ("The sentencing
guidelines ... must be consistent with all pertinent provisions of titles 18 and 28 .... ).
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direct) the sentencing judge to depart from the offense of conviction by
analogy, even when the offenses are not analogous. This departure relieves
Congress of accountability because the departure occurs at sentencing. The
judiciary is not accountable for the departure because of the mandatory nature
of the Guidelines. 68
IV. FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE AND THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: THE TAIL WHICH WAGS THE DOG
OF THE SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE
This Part of the Note analyzes the Sentencing Guidelines' use of the felony-
murder doctrine at sentencing. Again, this analysis is only necessary if federal
courts do not find malice aforethought to be an element of felonies-other
than murder-resulting in death. Even assuming, arguendo, that Congress and
the Sentencing Commission have the power to establish a felony-murder rule
that is applicable only at sentencing' 69 and that this extension of the felony-
murder rule is constitutional, 7 0 the Sentencing Guidelines' use of relevant
168. One commentator has written that the incentive for creating the Sentencing Commission was
that "[n]on-elective commissions could serve as buffering agencies, making unpopular sentencing
decisions that legislators would avoid." Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A
Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901,934 (1991). This provides support for the argument
that the adoption of the Guidelines avoids accountability on all sides. I believe, however, that what has
happened with the Guidelines, generally, and, their treatment of the felony-murder doctrine, specifically,
is not so devious. I believe that the Sentencing Commission attempted to rewrite the code through
"uniform sentencing." See infra part V. This would make sense. Since Congress could not agree on how
to rewrite the code, they got someone else to do it. That "someone" was the Commission in enacting
the Guidelines and currently is the judges who render departures by analogy.
Departure by analogy might ensure that similar offenses receive similar sentences. However, the
Sentencing Guidelines do not account for the subtle, and often irrational distinctions between similar
offenses, such as mens rea culpability. See infra part V. When a legislature defines two separate crimes,
A and B, with different punishments and a trial is had only on crime A, a judge may not sentence under
crime B no matter how analogous the offenses. The Supreme Court has stated that:
Decisions about what facts are material and what are immaterial, or, . . what "fact[s) [are]
necessary to constitute the crime," and therefore must be proved individually, and what facts
are mere means, represent value choices more appropriately made in the first instance by a
legislature than by a court.
Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2500 (1991) (citation omitted).
169. It should be noted that this Part of the Note, arguing that interpreting malice aforethought as
a sentencing factor violates due process, assumes that proof of the death of another person is an element
of the offense. It is clear to me that treating the death as a sentencing factor, as the Ryan court did,
United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1993), violates due process. Malice aforethought is
a closer issue, but if death may be a sentencing factor without first having been found to be an element
of the offense, then there is nothing that may be fairly characterized as "the tail which wags the dog of
the substantive offense." Nonetheless, the same arguments made here would apply (with more force)
to an analysis of the constitutionality of a sentencing scheme in which death is a sentencing factor.
170. The arguments in Part IV are not dependent upon the acceptance of the constitutional or
statutory arguments made in the previous Parts of this Note.
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conduct 171 to establish felony murder at sentencing violates the Due Process
Clause.
Under the Sentencing Commission's interpretation of the felonies resulting
in death the defendant may be acquitted of felony murder (or the prosecutor
may choose not to seek a conviction of felony murder), convicted of a simple
felony, but sentenced for felony murder. If the felony-murder rule is applied
at sentencing, the prosecution need only prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that a death occurred and that the defendant acted with "malice
aforethought." In fact, the prosecution would only have to prove the
occurrence of a death itself by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond
a reasonable doubt. The "logical" reasoning for this position is that the
standard of evidence at the sentencing stage is merely a "preponderance of
evidence,"'72 whereas the standard of evidence at the guilt/innocence stage
is "beyond a reasonable doubt."'' 7 ' The evidence of relevant conduct may
satisfy the burden at sentencing even though it failed to satisfy the burden at
trial. 174 But the Sentencing Guidelines find no refuge in "logic" when their
171. Relevant conduct is defined as:
[AII acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counselled, commanded, included,
procured, or wilfully caused by the defendant,... that occurred during the commission of the
offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
detection or responsibility for that offense.
U.S.S.G. § IB1.3(a)(1). In addition, the Guidelines include "all harm that resulted from acts or
omissions specified in subsection[] (a)(1)... above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and
omissions .... Id. § IB1.3(a)(3).
Eighth'Circuit Senior Judge Gerald W. Heaney has said that '"relevant conduct' is frequently just a
euphemism for separate and distinct crimes for which punishment cannot be imposed without
constitutional safeguards." Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing,
29 AM, CRIM. L. REXv. 771, 783 (1992). Judge Heaney argues that the Sentencing Guidelines evade the
safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "by characterizing particular criminal acts as 'relevant
conduct,' 'specific offense characteristics,' or 'enhancements.' Yet they require that specific,
nondiscretionary, additional prison time be added to a sentence for these acts, all without indictment,
jury trial, or the right of the accused to confront witnesses against him." Id. (emphasis in original).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 656-57 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Restrepo
II) (stating that use of the preponderance of evidence standard in sentencing proceedings generally
satisfies Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992); United States v. Frederick, 897 F.2d
490, 493 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that government must only establish facts under the Sentencing
Guidelines by a preponderance of the evidence), cert. denied, I I1 S. Ct. 171 (1990); United States v.
Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16-17 (Ist Cir. 1989); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 250-51 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); United States v. Ehret, 885 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990); United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)
(explaining that in the sentencing phase, judges have traditionally "heard evidence and found facts
without any prescribed burden of proof at all.").
173. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("The Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.").
174. A verdict of acquittal does not establish innocence, it demonstrates only a lack of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Martin, 972 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1058 (1993); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 1989). A defendant could be acquitted
of felony murder, be convicted of the simple felony, and still be sentenced for the death which resulted.
The "logical" reasoning for this argument is that even though the government could not satisfy the
burden of proof at trial (beyond a reasonable doubt), acquittal does not foreclose the government's
proving the mens rea for felony murder at sentencing by a mere preponderance of the evidence. See,
e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 179-82 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that at
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application breaches the barrier between the guilt/innocence stage and the
sentencing stage, or when the two stages become one.
A. McMillan v. Pennsylvania
The Supreme Court, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,'75 noted that due
process limits a legislature's power to impose liability on a defendant for facts
which are proven at the sentencing stage, rather than at the guilt/innocence
stage. In McMillan, the Supreme Court evaluated a Pennsylvania statute
treating visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor. The Court held
that due process does not require treating visible possession of a firearm as
an element of an offense to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than
as a sentencing factor. 76 However, the Court did state that due process may
require a higher burden of proof if a sentencing scheme may be fairly
characterized as the "tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."' 77
Thus, one must ask "When is a sentencing scheme the tail which wags the
dog of the substantive offense?" McMillan provides the answer. The Court
found several factors important in evaluating the Pennsylvania sentencing
scheme. Pennsylvania's sentencing scheme "neither alter[ed] the maximum
penalty for the crime committed nor create[d] a separate offense calling for
a separate penalty .. .. 17' The Court worried that a sentencing factor (the
tail) might have a disproportionate impact on (wag) the defendant's sentence
relative to the offense of conviction (the dog). The Court also found no
indication that the legislature had taken factors that were traditionally
considered elements of an offense and turned them into sentencing factors
with the intent of evading the presumption of innocence protected by the
"reasonable doubt" requirement. 79 The Court was again concerned that the
legislature might diminish the fundamental importance of the guilt/innocence
stage by enhancing the importance of the sentencing stage.
Courts should evaluate four factors in determining whether a sentencing
scheme is the tail wagging the dog of the substantive offense: 1) a sentencing
factor which greatly alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed,
especially if the factor "expose[s] [the defendant] to greater or additional
punishment"'8 0 beyond that provided for by the offense of conviction; 2) a
sentencing a judge may consider charges on which the defendant was acquitted because evidence may
satisfy the burden at sentencing even though it failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt), cert.
denied, Ill S. Ct. 127 (1990); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1989)
(finding that sentencing court may consider the defendant's possession of a handgun despite his acquittal
of the substantive firearm offense). This makes logical sense, but it does not address the problem of
whether the Sentencing Guidelines have altered or duplicated the elements of the original offense of
felony murder. See supra part III (altering the elements of an offense exceeds the Sentencing
Commission's powers); infra part IV.B.2 (Sentencing Guidelines create a "new offense").
175. McMillan, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
176. Id. at 91.
177. Id. at 88.
178. Id. at 87-88.
179. Id. at 89-90.
180. Id. at 88.
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sentencing factor which creates a new and separate offense; 3) a sentencing
factor that would traditionally be considered an element of an offense; and 4)
a sentencing scheme which circumvents the presumption of innocence
protected by the "reasonable doubt" requirement. Each one of these factors
arises when the Sentencing Guidelines allow a resulting death to be proved
as "relevant conduct." Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines application of felony-
murder doctrine is the "tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."
B. Application of the Four McMillan Factors
1. The Sentencing Guidelines Have a Disproportionate Impact
and Alter the Maximum Penalty
The Sentencing Guidelines consider "relevant conduct" when determining
the guideline applicable to a particular defendant. Prior to enactment of the
Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing courts were considered a defendant's actual
conduct (not just charged conduct)18" ' and several circuits have held that the
application of the Sentencing Guidelines has not changed the sentencing phase
so substantially that it now constitutes a separate criminal proceeding.
8 2
Such analyses, nevertheless, focused on the general nature of the Guidelines
and did not address the "if death results" provisions and their effect upon the
substantive federal offenses.
The felony-murder doctrine's application in sentencing federal offenses
through the Sentencing Guidelines' use of "relevant conduct" differs
substantially from the use of "relevant conduct" to establish other aggravating
factors because it allows the greatest possible increase in a sentence, that of
life in prison. The use of the felony-murder doctrine under the Sentencing
Guidelines is so quantitatively different from the use of other "relevant
conduct" that this "sentencing enhancement ... [should] be considered as an
element of the offense"' 83 and require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Third Circuit's analysis of the Guidelines' sentencing enhancement
provisions illuminates the unique effect of a resultant death. In United States
v. Mobley, 8 4 the Third Circuit upheld the enhancement of a sentence for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.' 5 The court enhanced the
sentence two levels because the firearm was stolen. Mobley received had he
181. United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1494 (1lth Cir. 1990).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 401 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1592 (1993).
183. United States v. Sanchez, 967 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1992). McMillan v. Pennsylvania may
demand such an analysis, but the issue was not addressed because the defendant did not raise it.
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79, 87-88 (1986). The Court stated that there may be a problem if the sentencing
scheme was "tailored to permit the [death] finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive
offense." Id. at 88.
184. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1992).
185. Id. (under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988)).
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been charged, convicted, and sentenced for violating a different federal
statute.
86
The Third Circuit upheld the sentence8 7 and held that Mobley had not
been deprived of due process, asserting that the government was entitled to
treat the stolen firearm as a sentencing factor rather than as an element of a
particular offense.' 8 The court explained that because Mobley's sentence
was still within the statutory maximum for the offense the Government
charged, "[tjhis is not the situation of a tail wagging the dog; but rather, of
two dogs having tails of equal length." 9 Notwithstanding this statement,
the court acknowledged that there are limits to the extent which Congress or
the Sentencing Commission can define sentence enhancements and offenses
so as to circumvent the Due Process Clause. 90
The distinction between the Sentencing Guidelines' treatment of the
possession of a firearm in Mobley and the Sentencing Guidelines' treatment
of the federal felony-murder rule is that Mobley had not been sentenced
beyond the range of the felony for which he was convicted. Thus, the court
could characterize the offense of conviction and the offense of sentencing as
"two dogs having tails of equal length."' 9' The incorporation of the felony-
murder doctrine through proof of "relevant conduct," on the other hand,
allows for imposition of a life sentence, a sentence far greater than the
sentence allowable for conviction of a simple felony. For example, "the basic
crime of arson under § 844(i) is punishable by no more than 10 years
imprisonment. With the additional proof of resulting death, the available
sanctions increase to any term of years, life imprisonment or death."' 92 The
Sentencing Guidelines application of the felony-murder doctrine has a
significantly larger tail (sentence) than the tail (sentence) for a simple felony.
This tail is so much larger that it can "fairly be characterized as 'a tail which
wags the dog of the substantive offense."'"93 McMillan supports this analysis
by acknowledging that Pennsylvania's tinkering with the line between
sentencing and trial might have been unconstitutional if the finding of the
186. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(i) or § 9220) (1988).
187. Mobley, 956 F.2d at 457.
188. Id. at 454-59.
189. Id. at 457 (referring to the Supreme Court's statement that a sentencing enhancement could be
inappropriate if it was "a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense." McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
190. Id. at 459. The Mobley court was acknowledging the statement in McMillan that the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt "applies to [some] facts not formally identified as elements of the
offense charged.' McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86.
191. Mobley, 956 F.2d at 457.
192. Reply Brief for Appellant at 7, United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092 (8th Cir. 1993) (No.
92-1357). The issue of whether the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum reemphasizes the
importance of determining exactly what are the elements of the "if death results" offenses. Supra part
I. The Sentencing Guidelines prohibit departure beyond the statutory maximum. U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.1. The
Sentencing Guidelines proceed, however, on the assumption that malice aforethought is not an element
of the offense. Supra part II.A.
193. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1101 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
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additional fact at sentencing exposed the defendant to punishment greater than
the statutory maximum allowed for by the offense of conviction. 94
Application of the felony-murder doctrine so that a resultant death is a
sentencing factor also has a disproportionate impact on the sentence relative
to the offense of conviction. The Third Circuit, in United States v. Kiku-
mura,19' held that the Sentencing Guidelines' use of relevant conduct could
"fairly be characterized as 'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive
offense"" 96 when the defendant's sentence was increased from thirty months
to thirty years based on the district court's finding at sentencing that the
defendant intended to commit murder.' 97 The Third Circuit held that in
order to support such a departure predicated upon the defendant's intent to
commit murder, the prosecution must establish the intent by "clear and
convincing evidence."'9 8 The defendant did not argue that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was required. As a result, the court "assume[d] without
deciding that the clear and convincing standard is sufficient" when "the
sentencing hearing [is] 'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive
offense."" 99
If the Government may establish Felony murder at sentencing, courts should
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the felony-murder
enhancements may infinitely increase a sentence,00 the use of relevant
conduct to satisfy the felony-murder doctrine should qualify for a clear and
convincing standard of evidence at an absolute minimum. "[D]ue process may
be violated if the punishment meted out following application of the
sentencing factors overwhelms or is extremely disproportionate to the
punishment that would otherwise be imposed. ' 20 ' Courts must give
substance to this due process limit by acknowledging that use of the felony-
murder doctrine at sentencing exceeds it.
In McMillan, the Supreme Court evaluated a Pennsylvania statute treating
visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor. The Court held that due
process does not require treating visible possession of a firearm as an element
of an offense to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than as a
194. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88. The distinction that the Eighth Circuit might make-that the death
is a sentencing factor and the statutory maximum is, therefore, life imprisonment-is paperthin. Such
a sentencing scheme would make the guilt/innocence stage a mere formality and largely irrelevant.
195. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084.
196. Id. at 1101-03 (citation omitted).
197. Id. at 1115. The defendant was convicted of interstate transportation of explosive devices for
manufacturing three lethal home-made firebombs in preparation for a terrorist bombing. Id.
198. Id. at 1100-02.
199. Id. at I101 (citation omitted).
200. Increasing a sentence to life imprisonment is an increase of the greatest degree possible without
reviving federal use of the death penalty. United States v. Ryan, 1993 WL 429092, at *8 (8th Cir. 1993)
("[T]he penalty proscribed for the resulting death is potentially infinitely more severe [than the penalty
for the underlying offense of arson] and is left to the discretion.., of the judge.').
201. United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 426 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) (noting
agreement by the Third, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1420 (1993); see United
States v. Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377, 1382 (7th Cir. 1992) (concern with "extreme" disparity); United States
v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450,456 (3d Cir. 1992) ("disproportionate impact"); United States v. Restrepo, 946
F.2d 654,659 (9th Cir. 1991) ("extremely disproportionate effect"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
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sentencing factor.20 2 The Court noted that the statute "neither alters the
maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense
calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's
discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it
without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm. 2 3 Pennsylva-
nia's "enumerated felonies retain the same elements they had before the
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act was passed. The Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture did not change the definition of any existing offense. '"2"a Thus, the
sentencing scheme gave no impression of having been designed or implement-
ed to avoid the presumption of innocence protected by the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. °5
By contrast, the basic crime of arson under 18 U.S .C. § 844(i) is punishable
by no more than ten years of imprisonment. Under the Sentencing Guidelines,
with the additional proof of a resulting death by relevant conduct, the
available sentence increases to any term of years, life imprisonment, or even
death. This would seem to distinguish the McMillan statute which did not alter
the maximum penalty for the crime committed. Alternatively, if Congress-in
enacting the Sentencing Guidelines-intended to remove from jury consider-
ation the essential fact (resulting death) that separates a defendant's exposure
to execution or life imprisonment from a maximum often years imprisonment,
then surely the Sentencing Guidelines are "tailored to permit the ... finding
[of death] to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense. 20 6
2. The Sentencing Guidelines Create a New Offense
The Third Circuit believed that its decision in Kikumura was consistent with
McDowell v. United States20 7 which involved no more than a four-level
increase or decrease to the defendant's offense level. "Moreover, McDowell
'explicitly d[id] not address the burden of proof in cases where a sentencing
adjustment constitutes more than a simple enhancement but a new and
separate offense.' 2 8 In upholding Pennsylvania's sentencing scheme, the
McMillan Court also noted that it did not "create[] a separate offense
. ".. -209 The Sentencing Guidelines' creation of a new offense of conviction
in sentencing "by analogy"21 distinguishes McMillan and is consistent with
202. McMillan, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
203. Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 89.
205. "Finally, we note that the specter raised by petitioners of States restructuring existing crimes
in order to 'evade' the commands of Winship just does not appear in this case." Id.
206. Id. at 88.
207. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that the preponderance of evidence
standard is generally appropriate in guidelines sentencing).
208. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101 n.16 (citation omitted); cf. id. at 1119-21 (Rosenn, J., concurring)
(arguing that although Kikumura was not convicted of attempted murder, the government should have
been required to charge and try him for that offense because that is the crime upon which the court
relied most heavily in sentencing him).
209. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
210. See supra part IIl.B.
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Kikumura's demand for a higher standard of proof. Using relevant conduct to
establish felony murder at sentencing requires a higher standard of proof to
comport with due process.
Specht v. Patterson21' and McMillan v. Pennsylvania212 both support this
proposition. Specht held that the right of confrontation was constitutionally
required in a Colorado sentencing scheme.213 This sentencing system
allowed the sentencing judge to increase the defendant's sentence to life from
ten years upon finding that the defendant was mentally ill, a habitual offender,
or a threat to the public. 2 4 Even though confrontation rights are not
generally guaranteed in sentencing systems, the Court guaranteed them in
Colorado's system because it contemplated an adversarial proceeding and "a
new finding of fact that was not an ingredient of the offense charged.
21 5
McMillan v. Pennsylvania also cited the important distinction based on the
fact-finding in Specht.2 6 The Sentencing Guidelines' creation of a new
offense of conviction in sentencing by analogy necessarily entails a new
finding of fact that was not an element of the offense charged and should,
therefore, qualify for greater procedural protection than Sentencing Guide-
lines' provisions generally." 7
3. Mens Rea for Killing Is Traditionally an Element of Murder
The federal felony-murder statute requires proof of mens rea for a
killing.21 8 Therefore, the incorporation of the felony-murder doctrine into the
sentencing stage distinguishes the Sentencing Guidelines' scheme from the
scheme in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.2 1 9 The Sentencing Guidelines have
taken factors traditionally considered elements of an offense and turned them
into sentencing factors.220
211. Specht, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
212. McMillan, 477 U.S. 79.
213. Specht, 386 U.S. at 608-09.
214. Id. at 607.
215. Id. at 608 (citations omitted).
216. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88-91.
217. The importance of the finding of fact was raised before Congress during hearings on the
Sentencing Guidelines:
It is one of the fine ironies of the Guidelines System that while it takes away the legitimate
judicial sentencing discretion which should rightfully repose in the district judge, it also grants
immense illegitimate "Star Chamber" fact-finding powers to that same judge, contrary to
American ideals and traditions in the criminal justice field.
Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 510 (1988) [hereinafter Sentencing
Guidelines Hearings) (statement of Judge Gerald W. Heaney, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit) (quoting Judge Eisele).
218. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
219. McMillan, 477 U.S. 79.
220. See id. at 89-90. The Supreme Court has upheld sentencing schemes which allow aggravating
factors to duplicate elements of the offense, but this has occurred in the limited and special
circumstances of capital sentencing. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988). Interestingly,
the death penalty may be seeing a revival in the prosecution of federal offenses. See, e.g., United States
v. Pitera, 795 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding a federal capital sentencing scheme for 21
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Mens rea has traditionally been a necessary element of the federal offense
of felony murder.22' The Supreme Court notes:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal
and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human
will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil.222
The Ninth Circuit has held that the defendant has a right to a jury trial when
the aggravating circumstances in an Arizona death penalty procedure "mirror
the attributes of an essential element of the offense during the guilt phase of
a trial. '223 The court found it significant that "to determine the existence of
the aggravating circumstances at issue here requires subjective and complex
inquiries into the defendant's state of mind .... These assessments directly
measure a defendant's 'moral guilt' and overall culpability-traditionally the
jury's domain of decision."224
A resolution of this issue may be as simple as acknowledging that the
Sentencing Commission's consideration of the defendant's mental state as
"relevant conduct '225 is misplaced. Consideration of "relevant conduct"
should mean that conduct is at issue, not mens rea divorced from the actus
reus. Mens rea in a felony murder context should be left to the province of
the jury. The importance of sentencing and the Sentencing Guidelines should
not diminish the importance of proof of the statutory elements of an offense,
and due process should require that mens rea be proven at trial.226 If mens
U.S.C. § 848 (continuing criminal enterprise) which allows the prosecutor to introduce the fact that the
killing was intentional as an aggravating factor even though this mirrors the mens rea element of the
charged crime because the statute requires the jury at the sentencing stage to find an additional
aggravating factor), affd mem., 986 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758
(D.N.J. 1991). The Eastern District of New York actually rejected the defendant's argument that a
"duplicative factor unfairly tips the sentencing balance by permitting the government to argue something
in aggravation that really adds nothing new to the crime of conviction." Pitera, 795 F. Supp. at 577.
221. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. This is to say nothing of the death itself-which
has always been an element of felony murder, even in strict liability schemes.
222. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,250 (1952) (Jackson, J.); see also Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (holding that in the absence of a contrary intention expressed in the
language or legislative history of a statute, criminal offenses retain mens rea as an element of the
offense); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) (stating that since
criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a disfavored status, "more than the simple omission of the
appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent
requirement").
223. Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990).
224. Id. at 1026-27 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982)). The Ninth Circuit also
noted that inquiries into the defendant's mental state "are identical in essence to those required under
the formal (statutory) distinctions Arizona makes among homicides." Id. at 1027 n.28. The same may
be said about the Sentencing Guidelines' use of the felony-murder doctrine at sentencing.
225. U.S.S.G. § lBI.3(a); id. cmt. (background) ("Subsection a(4) requires consideration of any other
information specified in the applicable guideline. For example,. . . the defendant's state of mind; [and]
... the risk of harm created.").
226. See supra part I.C.-D. The Third Circuit, in United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1101
(3d Cir. 1990), also raised the possibility that mens rea for murder might have to be proven at trial. The
court stated that there are two possible ways in which a court could provide sufficient process when
certain findings would increase a defendant's sentence from thirty months to thirty years:
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rea is to be considered "relevant conduct," courts must require proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. Shifting the burden of proving mens rea "offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental." '227
Additionally, unique circumstances exist when the defendant is to be
sentenced for an offense "equivalent" to murder, in terms of punishment.
Murder is qualitatively different from other offenses. It is a crime "so
grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death. '2 ' Because the opprobrium attached to murder is greater
than that for other offenses, the culpability required for such a conviction
should also be greater.
4. The Sentencing Guidelines' Treatment of a Resulting Death
Evades the Presumption of Innocence
The key difference between the sentencing scheme considered in McMillan
and the Sentencing Guidelines' scheme is the qualitative disparity which
arises when the actual conduct considered consists of elements of offenses
that the prosecutor has chosen not to charge. Vesting control over sentencing
in a relatively unbiased, objective, and neutral federal judge229 differs from
The first would place some limit on the concededly broad power of legislatures to define, and
courts to consider, conduct that is or could be criminalized as an aggravating factor at
sentencing. In effect, this approach would require that, for sentencing purposes, certain findings
in certain circumstances be made pursuant to the entire panoply of procedural protections that
apply at trial. Neither here nor in the district court, however, did Kikumura advance the
argument that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) is too slender a reed on which to support
consideration at sentencing of the defendant's specific intent to commit murder.
Id. (emphasis in original). The second-to increase some of the procedural protections applicable at
sentencing (including the evidentiary standard)--was argued by the defendant and accepted by the court.
Id.
227. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
523 (1958)).
228. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
227 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 190-93,198-201) (murder
is distinguished from manslaughter not only in punishment, but also in stigma).
Distinguishing between murder and other crimes is not merely a philosophical or academic
distinction. The Court finds the qualitative difference compelling enough to use it as a distinction
between those offenses which are death eligible and those which are not.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and
of injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve
the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape
by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The
murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer, for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and
normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which
is 'unique in its severity and irrevocability,' Gregg[], 428 U.S. at 1870, is an excessive penalty
for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
229. I recoguize that this view may be unrealistic, but it is one of the premises upon which our
system of government is based.
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vesting such discretion in the prosecutor, who represents a party to the
case.230 Prosecutors can use their discretion to evade the presumption of
innocence protected by the "reasonable doubt" requirement because, under the
Sentencing Guidelines' system of "real conduct" sentencing, it is the
prosecutor who holds the tail and wags the dog as he or she sees fit.
Courts and commentators have recognized "the danger that United States
Attorneys may seek indictments for less serious offenses that are easier to
prove and then seek substantially increased sentences based on the uncharged
conduct."' ' A federal prosecutor may obtain conviction of a simple felony,
like arson, which carries a statutory maximum of ten years.232 Then, at
sentencing, the prosecutor may submit evidence of a resulting death to
increase the possible sentence to life imprisonment.233 The Eighth Circuit
believes that this danger is adequately addressed by the fact that the district
judges are "authorized to require the United States Attorney to undertake the
burden of presenting evidence to prove that conduct. 234 The Chairman of
the Sentencing Commission, United States Circuit Judge William W. Wilkins,
Jr., and General Counsel John R. Steer agree that the district judge retains
adequate control over this sentencing practice through the assumption of an
appropriate burden of proof.
235
230. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1119 (Rosenn, J., concurring) (stating that sentencing scheme that
"replaced judicial discretion over sentencing with prosecutorial discretion" would violate a defendant's
due process rights); United States v. Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076, 1080 n.6 (D. Utah 1990) (minimum
mandatory sentencing statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines have resulted in defacto sentencing by
police and prosecutors); Freed, supra note 140, at 1725 (asserting that defendant must rely on his
attorney's ability to negotiate a sentence with the prosecutor "to the extent that the guidelines strip
judges of sentencing discretion"); Heaney, supra note 171, at 774 (arguing that prosecutors have
replaced judges as the determiners of sentencing); Melissa M. McGrath, Comment, Federal Sentencing
Law: Prosecutorial Discretion in Determining Departures Based on Defendant's Cooperation Violates
Due Process, 15 S. ILL. U. L.. 321 (1991); Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 20, 1990, at 1. But see William W. Wilkins, Response
to Judge Heaney, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 795, 802-05 (1992).
Even Senator Kennedy, one of the original advocates of the Sentencing Guidelines, believes that they
are being abused by federal prosecutors because of their mandatory nature:
Some advocates of mandatory sentencing believe that coerced uniformity is appropriate. But
the mandatory statutes do not produce uniformity; they merely transfer discretion from judges
to prosecutors, who decide whether defendants will be charged with an offense carrying a
mandatory penalty and whether to insist on a plea to that count of the indictment. A guideline
system makes judges accountable for the discretion they exercise; mandatory sentencing laws
impose no similar check on prosecutors.
Edward M. Kennedy, Foreword, 29 AM. ClM. L. REV. (1992).
231. United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 427 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing William W. Wilkins &
John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L.
Ray. 495, 500 (1990)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1420 (1993); see also Freed, supra note 140, at 1714
(Relevant conduct "allows a prosecutor to increase an offender's sentence more easily by dropping
charges than by bringing them... [and] allows the [prosecutor] to introduce evidence of another crime
at the sentencing stage that was withheld from trial because the [prosecutor] could not prove it 'beyond
a reasonable doubt.") (alteration in original).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
233. U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(c)(l).
234. Galloway, 976 F.2d at 427.
235. Wilkins & Steer, supra note 231, at 500.
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While Chairman Wilkins may maintain that such a burden is "appropriate"
in some contexts, it raises serious constitutional questions in the felony-
murder context, where the conduct at issue is the "tail which wags the dog of
the substantive offense." Moreover, this judicial control warrants merely a
preponderance of the evidence standard. 36
Under this type of system, the prosecutor may stockpile accusations of
conduct far more serious than the conduct at issue in trial and present the
accusations at sentencing where the burden is comparatively negligible.
It is proper to enhance a defendant's sentence for conduct related to
the offense of conviction such as role in the offense, degree of planning
required, and the defendant's criminal history. The Guidelines already do
this, but they go further by also mandating incremental penalties for
separate offenses that the prosecution has not and may not be able to
prove. 237
At least one state commission has concluded that a relevant conduct system
not based on convicted conduct would violate due process by failing to
provide the defendant notice of the specific charge. 38
V. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: CURING THE SYMPTOMS
OR THE DISEASE?
Felony murder is a doctrine of substantive law, and courts should limit their
use of it to substantive law. The Sentencing Commission, however, interpreted
the growth of the Federal Criminal Code to include an expansion of the
felony-murder doctrine beyond substantive law. This has caused confusion as
to what mens rea is necessary to hold a defendant liable for a death that
occurs during the commission of a felony. The Sentencing Commission may
have attempted to make sense of the haphazard expansion of the felony-
murder doctrine by applying it to all defendants who cause a death. Uniform
application of the felony-murder doctrine is a noble, sensible, and necessary
goal-but the Sentencing Guidelines are an improper place to tinker with the
Federal Criminal Code. A more appropriate approach would begin with a
legislative overhaul of the Federal Criminal Code.
236. See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 656-57 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Restrepo
II) (stating that use of the preponderance of evidence standard in sentencing proceedings generally
satisfies the Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
237. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1522 n. 15 (6th Cir. 1992) (Merritt, CJ., dissenting),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1595 (1993).
238. DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA'S
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 62-63, 159-61 (Daniel J. Freed ed. 1988). Minnesota did not adopt a real
conduct sentencing scheme because "[the [Minnesota] Commission believed that it would be
fundamentally unfair to base a presumptive sentence on an offense for which the defendant had not been
charged or convicted." Id. at 63. The Supreme Court has unanimously stated:
No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the
specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if
desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all
courts, state or federal.
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948).
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Perhaps the Sentencing Commission knew it was blurring the line between
conviction for felony murder and conviction for simple felonies. The Policy
Statement for the Sentencing Guidelines explains that the United States
Sentencing Commission "analyzed data drawn from ... the differing elements
of various crimes as distinguished in substantive criminal statutes, . . in
order to determine which distinctions were important in pre-guidelines
practice. After consideration, the Commission accepted, modified, or
rationalized these distinctions."'2 9 The Commission, in fact, knew it was
changing the existing code and the principles and "distinctions" upon which
it was based. Unfortunately, it attempted to cure the symptoms of disparity in
sentencing 24 rather than calling on Congress to cure the disease of the Federal
Criminal Code.
The Sentencing Commission modified and rationalized the elements of
various crimes in seeking uniformity, but the federal statutes currently do not
allow for uniformity. The tendency to aggregate similar cases2 41 and seek
uniformity in sentencing may have resulted in the Commission's tendency to
aggregate statutory offenses. "In its overriding quest to forestall disparity, the
Commission tends to apply the same measuring rods to persons of widely
varying culpability ... ."242 To make the sentences for different statutes
uniform requires recodifying the statutes or interpreting the statutes so that
they require comparable culpability. Making them uniform at sentencing
exceeds the Commission's authority and Congress' goals.243
To say that the Commission exceeded its authority and Congress' goals is
not to say that the action the Commission took should be condemned. On the
contrary, the Commission was pursuing an important goal-recodifying
federal criminal law. The error lies in how the Commission attempted to
achieve the goal. The Sentencing Commission stated: "For one thing, the
hundreds of overlapping and duplicative statutory provisions that make up the
federal criminal law forced the Commission to write guidelines that are
descriptive of generic conduct rather than guidelines that track purely
statutory language."'24 The Commission acknowledged that real progress
would necessitate an overhaul of the federal code, 245 but went ahead and did
239. U.S.S.G. § 1A3 (emphasis added).
240. Freed, supra note 140, at 1740-41 ("There are at least two approaches to reducing unwarranted
disparity: a legislature or outside agency can try to force it out of the system with severe rules; or
courts, in cooperation with an agency, can probe the causes of disparity and evolve agreed upon
principles and norms to help sentencers achieve greater consistency... The U.S. Sentencing
Commission chose the former.").
241. "Preguidelines regimes emphasized individual punishment; to a considerable extent, guidelines
regimes substitute punishment based on aggregation of similar cases." Alschuler, supra note 168, at 902
(stating that aggregation of sentences through guidelines and mandatory minimums increases injustice).
242. Freed, supra note 140, at 1705. The 1993 amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
may have been an attempt to account for culpability. See supra part lI.B.
243. The Judiciary Committee did not intend to restructure the pre-existing statutes. S. REP. No. 225,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3270 (1984) (the Judiciary Committee "postponed the restructuring of Federal
offenses according to their relative seriousness").
244. U.S.S.G. § lA4.a.
245. Id. § IA3.
1994I
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
a patchwork job of addressing the politically popular problem of uniformity
in sentencing.
The Federal Courts Study Committee noted the confluence between the
problems of the sentencing guidelines and the problems of the federal code
and acknowledged the necessity of addressing those problems.2
4 6
A number of criticisms of the guidelines may actually be criticisms
of the arbitrary structure of the federal criminal laws, a structure made
transparent by the guidelines. There are thousands of separate federal
criminal prohibitions, enacted at different times, reflecting different penal
attitudes, and full of gaps and overlaps. We urge Congress to resume the
task, formidable as it is, of recodifying federal criminal law in order to
bring about a simplified, rationalized, and coherent system of prohibi-
tions.247
Today, there are more than 3000 separate federal statutory offenses.248
Comprehensive crime bills come before Congress each session, but are
rejected or revised, resulting in an expansion of the Federal Criminal Code by
accretion. The current array of criminal laws is so disheveled that one
commentator has suggested that it may not even properly be recognized as a
criminal "code.1 249 For example, the Code uses more than seventy-five
terms to describe the requisite statutory mens rea of federal criminal
offenses.Y° This has led to great difficulty for courts in establishing the
mens rea that a prosecutor must show to establish a violation of a federal offense.sI
246. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
106 (1991) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY REPORT] ("lack of a rational criminal code has also
hampered the development of a rational sentencing system").
247. Id. at 23.
248. Id. at 106.
249. Gainer, supra note 166, at 113. Gainer proposes that the code has developed through hindsight
rather than foresight, "as a series of sporadic attempts to resolve crises of the moment." Id. at 113-14.
250. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY REPORT, supra note 246, at 106 (78 terms used); I WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 35, at 119-20 (more than 75 terms).
251. The Supreme Court has noted the uncertainty of mens rea definitions as the result of the
haphazard expansion of federal criminal law: "Few areas of criminal law pose more problem than the
proper definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime." United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
394, 403 (1980) (emphasis in original); see also Kenneth R. Feinberg, Toward a New Approach to
Proving Culpability: Mens Rea and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 123,
124 (1980) (asserting that a new code would resolve the problems faced by lawyers and judges in
determining mens rea requirements of a criminal offense).
The Federal Courts Study Committee suggested a "checklist" that congressional legislative staffs
should consider when analyzing pending legislation for technical problems. Several of these suggestions
are clearly related to avoiding statutory problems in the criminal code: "the definition of key terms; the
mens rea requirement in criminal statutes; ... whether a proposed bill would repeal or otherwise
circumscribe, displace, impair, or change the meaning of existing federal legislation ...." FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY REPORT, supra note 246, at 91. Solving such problems does not have to benefit only
those charged with violations. Addressing these exact same concerns through recodification has been
deemed necessary in order to ensure adequate and effective prosecution of crime. See Gainer, supra note
166, at 101 (discussing the necessity for, and benefits of, Federal Criminal Code reform). Gainer's
article was originally a document prepared for the Attorney General of the United States by the Office
of Legal Policy of the United States in 1989. Gainer believes that recodification is necessary to ensure
proper prosecution and enforcement. For example, Gainer believes that the present code "has invited
defense counsel to confuse juries with rhetoric concerning 'mens rea' and 'criminal intent."' Id. at 100
(emphasis in original).
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The Federal Courts Study Committee has stated that the need for recodifica-
tion is "a pressing matter for Congress's attention." '252 Proposed recodifica-
tion of the criminal code and the corresponding uniform definition of mens
rea terms would "encourage uniformity and consistency. '253 While this was
in fact the reason for promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing
stage is not the proper and legitimate place to make sense of the code.
CONCLUSION
Recent cases illuminate the importance of articulating the limits to a
legislature's ability to enhance the importance of the sentencing stage and
diminish the importance of the guilt/innocence stage. For example, in Nichols
v. McCormick,25 4 the Ninth Circuit held that a sentencing enhancement
which increased the defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum for
the offense of conviction did not violate the defendant's due process rights as
defined in McMillan v. Pennsylvania255 or the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights.256
Nichols is simply and clearly a misinterpretation of McMillan. Nichols
involved a Montana statute which stated that the use of a weapon during the
commission of a felony mandated an increase in the punishment provided for
the commission of such an offense of between two and ten years.257 Thus
Nichols, like McMillan, involved the use of a firearm as a sentencing factor.
The statute at issue in Nichols, however, altered the maximum penalty for the
crime committed rather than "operat[ing] solely to limit the sentencing court's
252. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY REPORT, supra note 246, at 106 (1990).
The need for recodification has long been recognized, but its accomplishment has been
indefinitely postponed. Congress authorized a National Commission on the Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws in 1966, and the Commission presented its report to Congress in 1971.
Unfortunately, this work never came to fruition despite repeated efforts in Congress between
1971 and 1982. The effort must be resumed, and a new code should be created to assist in this
undertaking. The Commission should work with Congress, the judiciary, and the Department
of Justice to focus public and professional attention on the need for a revised criminal code,
to develop draft legislation, and to help shepherd the resulting bills through the legislative
process.
Id.
253. Feinberg, supra note 251, at 124 (citation omitted).
254. Nichols, 929 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1226 (1992).
255. McMillan, 477 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986) (Pennsylvania's sentencing factor "neither alters the
maximum penaltfor the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a penalty; it operates
solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available
to it without the [sentencing factor] .. .") (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
256. Nichols, 929 F.2d 507. The Sixth Amendment protects the accused's right "to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation... [and] to be confronted with the witnesses against him...
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
This blatant disregard for the defendant's due process and Sixth Amendment rights has not escaped
the federal courts' application of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050
(9th Cir. 1991) (relying on Nichols in upholding federal sentencing enhancement for use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon even though the sentence could then exceed the "normal" statutory maximum by as
many as seven years).
257. Nichols, 929 F.2d at 509.
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discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it
without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm. 258
Even assuming the propriety of the Ninth Circuit's application of McMillan,
one may distinguish Nichols from the use of uncharged conduct to prove
felony murder because the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony
is a factor that is traditionally considered at the sentencing phase. 9 In
contrast, proof of a culpable mind is a factor traditionally regarded as an
element of an offense and required for conviction.
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Kikumura,260 correctly notes that
due process requires the court to limit the use of the preponderance of
evidence standard at sentencing in certain cases. The Supreme Court's concern
in McMillan mandates that courts prove a resultant death and the defendant's
culpable mens rea by a higher standard of proof than a mere preponderance
of the evidence. "[S]entencing proceedings are arguably the most important
judicial business conducted by Article III judges,' '26 and are clearly the
most important business conducted in a felony-murder scenario. Courts should
give substance to the McMillan due process limit and require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of all the elements of felony murder at the guilt/innocence
stage rather than at the sentencing stage.
The Supreme Court has not revisited McMillan v. Pennsylvania to clarify
the due process limits that the Court acknowledged but did not define. Other
federal courts (as exemplified by the Third Circuit's decision in Kikumura)
have expressed concern regarding the application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines. These courts have failed, however, to delineate limits on a legislature's
ability to blur the line between the guilt/innocence stage and the sentencing
stage. Because federal courts have ignored what seems the simplest command
'of McMillan and the Due Process Clause-that a sentencing factor may not
enhance the sentence beyond the statutory maximum-Congress and the
Supreme Court must speak on this issue.
Chief Justice Rehnquist "cited a need to adjust Federal sentencing
guidelines and procedural rules" as a major concern he hoped Congress would
address in 1993 .262 The felony-murder doctrine, with its difficult and
uncertain handling of mens rea, requires special attention at the statutory level
and at the sentencing level. In light of the confusion over the application of
the felony-murder rule at trial and the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on
the felony-murder doctrine, Congress should take two actions. Congress
should directly address the problems with the Federal Criminal Code and its
definitions of the mens rea elements of all offenses. This would require
258. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
259. Id. at 89-90; see supra part IV.A.
260. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
261. Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years, 60
GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 857, 889 (1992) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be amended
to include greater protection for the defendant in light of the more adversarial nature of the sentencing
hearings).
262. Chief Justice Urges Cooperation with Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1993, at A19.
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adopting a revised Federal Criminal Code. Congress should also limit the use
of the felony-murder doctrine to the guilt/innocence stage. These two actions
would provide notice to all defendants of the charges they face. They would
also prevent the prosecution from circumventing the presumption of innocence
and protect the jury's role as finder of fact.
In the absence of congressional action, or in the interim, courts should
recognize that a resulting death and a culpable mens rea for that death are
fundamental elements of any murder offense and courts should address the
propriety of a statute which goes beyond strict liability. The Supreme Court
first stated, and the circuit courts have agreed, that there exist due process
limits to a sentencing scheme or a sentencing factor that is the "tail which
wags the dog of the substantive offense. 263 Use of the felony-murder
doctrine at sentencing exceeds the limits of due process. In order to secure the
full panoply of constitutional protections, courts must require the Government
to prove felony murder at trial.
Should federal courts fail to do so, they must still delineate procedural
limits for application of the Sentencing Guidelines. "[W]hatever procedures
the courts ultimately adopt they will be an ugly and pale parody of, and
substitute for the majesty and glory of the protections afforded by the
Constitution. ' '21 If the Government may establish felony murder at
sentencing, as the Sentencing Commission directs and the Eighth Circuit held,
courts should go beyond the commands of the Kikumura court and require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. At a bare minimum, the Court must give
substance to the Due Process Clause and McMillan v. Pennsylvania by stating
that a sentence may never exceed the statutory maximum for the simple felony
which is the offense of conviction.
263. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
264. Sentencing Guidelines Hearings, supra note 217, at 512.
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